Category: Daubert

Court Finds Ship Has Sailed for Seaman to Disclose Expert’s Opinions, Resulting in Summary Judgment

Share

Discovery deadlines exist for a reason.  Although there are exceptions to every rule – and often a rule dictating how to handle such exceptions – litigants in federal court are expected to show their evidentiary cards in a timely, orderly fashion that avoids surprise.  In the context of expert discovery, this means inter alia that witnesses who have been retained specifically to offer expert opinion testimony must author a written report (i.e., a Rule 26 report) setting out their opinions and the bases for those opinions.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).  Opinions that are inadequately disclosed may be excluded at trial.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).  In some cases, this can leave a litigant unable to make a prima facie case and survive summary judgment.

One recent example is Adkins v. Marathon Petroleum Company LP, — F. Supp. 3d. —, 2023 WL 3242432 (S.D. Ohio 2023).  In Adkins, Plaintiff alleged that his exposure to hydrogen sulfide (H2S) fumes while working as a tankerman on Defendant’s barge caused him permanent pulmonary injuries.  He sued his employer, asserting three causes of action based on this theory:  (1) a claim under the Jones Act, (2) Unseaworthiness, and (3) Maintenance and Cure.  But each of these causes of action required Plaintiff to establish that his exposure to H2S fumes caused his alleged injuries.  Both parties agreed that H2S fumes can cause pulmonary injuries at high enough concentrations, but there was a problem in Plaintiff’s case – both he and his coworkers routinely wore badges designed to alert the wearer if H2S levels exceeded a certain threshold (which threshold was undisputedly below the OSHA regulatory limit and NIOSH short-term exposure limit), and there was no documentation that Plaintiff’s badge had ever alarmed.  In short, it was not at all obvious that Plaintiff had been exposed to enough H2S to cause his claimed injuries.  Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiff was unable to establish general and specific causation.

Continue reading “Court Finds Ship Has Sailed for Seaman to Disclose Expert’s Opinions, Resulting in Summary Judgment”

What Dose Makes the Poison? Where Expert Cannot Say, Eleventh Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment

Share

A central tenet of toxicology is that “the dose makes the poison.” Every chemical is toxic if enough of it is consumed, and every chemical has some dose – even if miniscule – at which it poses no significant risk. A chemical must be given in sufficient amount – something exceeding the “threshold dose” – before it will cause effects. This has obvious implications for toxic tort litigation, where a plaintiff who alleges injury from exposure to a toxic chemical must prove at minimum that he or she was exposed to enough of the chemical to produce the alleged injury. This poses a problem for plaintiffs who have been exposed only to very small doses of the chemical at issue. What is a plaintiff to do when their exposure falls below the threshold dose? One approach that generally does not work is to reject the very concept of a threshold dose altogether.

In Pinares v. Raytheon Technologies Corporation, 2023 WL 2661521 (11th Cir. Mar. 28, 2023), Plaintiff alleged that she had developed kidney cancer after chemical compounds from the defendant’s facility made their way into the groundwater near her home. Plaintiffs relied on three experts to prove causation – a toxicologist to establish general causation and two physicians to establish specific causation. The district court excluded Plaintiffs’ toxicology expert, holding that the expert had not conducted a reliable dose-response assessment. The district court then also excluded each of Plaintiffs’ specific causation experts, noting that they had not performed an independent dose-response assessment of their own and therefore relied on the toxicology expert’s deficient opinion. Plaintiffs could not establish causation without expert opinion, and the district court therefore granted summary judgment.

Continue reading “What Dose Makes the Poison? Where Expert Cannot Say, Eleventh Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment”

Texas Supreme Court Refocuses on Causation and Affirms Summary Judgment in Herbicide Drift Case

Share

The question of whether a particular application of herbicide on one property caused damage on another’s property requires expert testimony.  When a plaintiff claims that herbicide drift caused reduced crop yields, it is not enough for an expert to opine merely that the drift caused damage to plants – the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s application of the herbicide caused the reduced crop yield.  The distinction may sound nuanced but can have profound ramifications on litigation.  This is well illustrated in the Texas Supreme Court’s recent decision in Helena Chemical Company v. Cox, — S.W. 3d –, 2023 WL 2335694 (Tex. Mar. 3, 2023), an important and highly followed case focusing on the causation requirement in cases alleging yield loss to a crop from alleged exposure to pesticides.

The plaintiffs in Cox were cotton farmers who alleged that the defendant had supervised an aerial application of herbicide that drifted onto plaintiffs’ properties and damaged their crops, causing reduced yields.  A government inspector conducted a visual inspection of the damaged crops and claimed to find “markers” for the herbicide’s two active ingredients, but no lab testing was performed.  The inspector also identified no “consistent pattern” or “drift pattern” of crop damage over the large area encompassing the various plaintiffs’ noncontiguous properties.  Plaintiffs disclosed a slate of experts to support their allegations, but the trial court excluded the experts and granted summary judgment to the defendant.  The court of appeals reversed, finding the experts admissible despite their inability to trace the alleged drift of the herbicide in question from defendants’ application site to plaintiffs’ properties.

Continue reading “Texas Supreme Court Refocuses on Causation and Affirms Summary Judgment in Herbicide Drift Case”

The Zantac Rule 702 Order: TLBR (Too Long, But Read)

Share

On opening an opinion, lawyers habitually roll their eyes when they see a table of contents.  Even more so when they learn the opinion is over 300 pages.  The MDL order granting defense motions to exclude experts and for summary judgment in In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Products Liability Litig. (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2022), however, is a worthwhile read.  The court’s analysis and prose is thorough, clearly reasoned, well-supported, … and highly readable.  It reveals a court willing to roll up its judicial sleeves, tackle and explain the fundamental science in detail, and rigorously apply Rule 702 to perform its essential gatekeeping function – to insulate the jury, and the defendants, from flawed advocacy masquerading as scientific evidence and holding retained experts to reasonable standards of intellectual rigor.

The Zantac litigation involves claims that the active ingredient in popular heartburn medication ranitidine breaks down to produce excessive levels of NDMA, a probable human carcinogen, under certain storage and biological conditions.  That sounds scary.  FDA has set a low daily intake limit of NDMA, a byproduct of, among other things, a common diet.

Continue reading “The Zantac Rule 702 Order: TLBR (Too Long, But Read)”

Listen Up Class: The Role of Daubert at the Class Certification Stage in the Ninth Circuit

Share

Class certification is the feature fight of any putative class action lawsuit. If granted, it can multiply the stakes of a case several hundred- or thousand-fold. If denied, it can signal the end of the litigation. Because of its importance, parties often invest heavily in the class certification fight, including by offering – and challenging – expert testimony.

As this trend has become more common, more focus has been devoted to answering a key question – to what extent should Rule 702 apply at this critical juncture? A number of circuits have held that Rule 702 applies in full force and that opinions deemed inadmissible under Rule 702 should not be considered in regard to class certification; others, such as the Ninth Circuit, have taken a somewhat different approach. Recently, the Southern District of California, in Stewart v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., 2022 WL 5236821 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2022), weighed in on this question.

Continue reading “Listen Up Class: The Role of Daubert at the Class Certification Stage in the Ninth Circuit”

Experts’ Disagreement with Medical Literature Leads to Exclusion

Share

Peer-reviewed literature can be a powerful tool in attacking an opposing expert’s opinions.  A solid, on-point article can do more than merely satisfy several of the so-called Daubert factors for assessing reliability – by showing a court that others in a challenged expert’s field disagree with his or her opinions, literature can remove any expert “aura” that might discourage a lay judge from discharging his or her duty as a gatekeeper.  Presenting literature that directly undermines the expert’s opinion can make the difference between winning and losing a motion to exclude, especially where the expert’s opinion is not supported by other literature accepted in the field.

A recent example is U.G. v. United States, 2022 WL 7426212 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2022), a medical malpractice action under the Federal Tort Claims Act in which plaintiff suffered a shoulder injury during his birth and was later diagnosed with permanent Erb’s palsy, or brachial plexus injury.  He alleged that the obstetrician caused the injury by using excessive force on his head and shoulders during delivery.  In support of his claims, he offered two causation experts – an obstetrician/gynecologist and a pediatric neurologist– both of whom claimed the “totality of the circumstances” ruled out several possible alternate causes and thus showed that the defendant caused the injury.

Continue reading “Experts’ Disagreement with Medical Literature Leads to Exclusion”