Patrick Ebeling

Pat provides counsel on product regulatory compliance and is focused on defending companies in complex product liability and mass tort litigation.

View the full bio for Patrick Ebeling at the Faegre Drinker website.

Articles by Patrick Ebeling:


Fifth Circuit Clouds Threshold Dose Analysis in Ruffin v. BP

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Plaintiffs in toxic tort cases must prove both general and specific causation, generally through the testimony of experts. Experts must establish that a specific chemical exposure can (and did) cause the specific injury at issue. In order to make that showing, the plaintiff’s exposure must at least have exceeded the minimum harmful level of the chemical — the “threshold dose.” As the Eleventh Circuit made clear last year in its handling of In re Deepwater Horizon BELO litigation (which we discussed here), threshold dose is a concept that straddles general and specific causation. A more recent BELO case, Ruffin v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc., — F.4th —, 2025 WL 1367185 (5th Cir. May 12, 2025), shows how isolating an expert’s general causation opinion from its implications on specific causation can cloud the analysis.

In Ruffin, the plaintiff worked for five months as a clean-up worker following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. He was diagnosed with prostate cancer five years later and sued the defendant, claiming he was exposed to chemicals that caused his cancer. He described two instances of exposure: one when oil splashed onto his face while travelling by boat and another when he fell in the water. The plaintiff had a known genetic risk for prostate cancer, but his expert claimed the oil exposures were a “second and necessary hit to initiate his prostate cancer.” The defendant moved to exclude the plaintiff’s causation expert, a genetic and molecular epidemiologist, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The district court had excluded both the expert’s general and specific causation opinions as unreliable, largely for failure to specify a threshold dose, and then granted summary judgment for want of admissible expert evidence.

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Foundation, Not Façade — The Fifth Circuit Affirms the Proper Basis Requirement for Admissibility of Expert Opinions in Newsome v. International Paper Co.

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In a toxic tort case, plaintiffs must establish general causation. If a substance is incapable of causing the type of injury plaintiff claims, then it certainly didn’t cause theirs. Under Texas law, toxic tort plaintiffs must prove general causation either by “direct, scientifically reliable proof,” or by “indirect” epidemiological evidence. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714-15 (Tex. 1977). In Newsome v. International Paper Company, plaintiff attempted to bypass this foundational requirement, and neither the district court, nor the Fifth Circuit was fooled. WL 5117195 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024).

In Newsome, plaintiff was a truck driver for a company that supplied International Paper with sodium hydrosulfide (NaHS). Under certain conditions, NaHS releases hydrogen sulfide (H2S), an invisible gas with a characteristic rotten-egg odor. During a delivery in January 2019, plaintiff alleged he “smelt something” then “came to” on the ground. He presented to an urgent care clinic the following day but was diagnosed with only a rash. He did not visit a doctor again for four months. Then, more than a year later, plaintiff sued International Paper claiming “a host of life-threatening injuries” related to his alleged exposure to H2S.

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Same Song, Different Verse — Causation Experts for Second Group of Bellwether Plaintiffs Excluded for Same Reason as First Group’s Expert in In re Deepwater Horizon BELO Cases

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Multidistrict litigation is meant to “promote the just and efficient conduct” of actions “involving one or more common questions of fact” by transferring those actions to a single district court “for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). In MDLs involving alleged physical injury or illness caused by a product, one “common question of fact” is general causation. Each plaintiff in the MDL must prove that the product is capable of causing the injury or illness. We think it is usually — if not always — most “just and efficient” to address general causation on an MDL-wide basis as early as practicable. Some courts disagree, testing general causation initially on just a subset of plaintiffs in the MDL; when those efforts fail, other plaintiffs may be permitted to try again, perhaps with new general causation experts. But the plaintiffs’ second attempt to establish general causation often fails to remedy the problems that doomed the first attempt (as we have discussed before), merely amplifying costs for both parties before reaching the same result. The In re Deepwater Horizon BELO (Back-End Litigation Option) Cases litigation, while not formally centralized as an MDL itself, provides another example. In re Deepwater Horizon BELO Cases, 119 F.4th 937 (11th Cir. 2024).

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