Design Defect Archives - Faegre Drinker on Products

Category: Design Defect

Expert’s Results-Driven Methodology Leads to Exclusion and Summary Judgment in Paraquat MDL

An expert witness is not supposed to pick a desired result and then reverse engineer inputs and methods that reach that result. As the Ninth Circuit observed 30 years ago, “[c]oming to a firm conclusion first and then doing research to support it is the antithesis of [the scientific] method.” Claar v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 502-03 (9th Cir. 1994). A recent opinion from the Southern District of Illinois offers a fine example of an expert with a results-driven approach and a court that called him out on it.

In re Paraquat Products Liability Litigation, 2024 WL 1659687 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2024), arises from a multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) in which the plaintiffs claim to have developed Parkinson’s disease as a result of exposure to an herbicide, paraquat. Four plaintiffs whose cases had been chosen for the MDL’s first trials offered a statistician (the parties disputed whether he also qualified as an epidemiologist) as their sole expert to establish general causation. He had a difficult task, as no peer-reviewed literature established a link between paraquat exposure and Parkinson’s disease. Indeed, when the court asked the plaintiffs to identify such literature, the plaintiffs could cite only a single opinion article. That article had been shared with another of the plaintiffs’ experts before it was published, leading the court to conclude in deciding a prior discovery dispute that there was reason to investigate “whether counsel for the MDL plaintiffs, their experts, or other third parties may have influenced the contents of the article for the benefit of one side in the MDL.” 2023 WL 8372819 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2023).

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Missing the Mark: Summary Judgment Granted Where Plaintiff’s Experts Opine on Defect but Fail to Support Causation

Product liability claims require proof of causation. To be sure, they also require proof of some defect in the product and/or its accompanying warnings and product literature. But defect and causation are separate elements of a prima facie claim, and both must be established – usually, through expert testimony. As we have discussed on multiple occasions (for example, here and here), a plaintiff’s failure to offer admissible expert testimony on each element can lead to summary judgment. A recent decision from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania offers yet another illustration.

In Slatowski v. Sig Sauer, Inc., 2024 WL 1078198 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2024), the plaintiff was an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officer who was injured when his pistol fired unintentionally during a marksmanship training exercise. He sued the gun manufacturer, alleging that a design defect in the gun’s integral safety feature – specifically, the lack of a tabbed trigger – caused the firearm to discharge unintentionally. The plaintiff proffered two experts in support of the claim: a gunsmith and a certified firearms instructor and range safety officer with a Ph.D. in ergonomics. The defendant moved to exclude both experts’ opinions and also moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff had no admissible expert testimony to establish causation.

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Pennsylvania Stays in a Minority of Two States in Prohibiting Evidence of Compliance With Government and Industry Standards in Products Liability Design Defect Cases

Just before Christmas, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court delivered a lump of coal to products liability defendants: Sullivan v. Werner Co., 2023 WL 8859656 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2023), affirming a lower court ruling that barred evidence of a product manufacturer’s compliance with government and industry standards in a strict liability design defect case. The lower courts held that such evidence goes to due care and is relevant only to negligence, not strict liability. The affirmance appears to support the exclusion of such evidence in design defect cases based on a risk-utility theory, but leaves uncertainty for the future because only three justices joined the principal opinion; a fourth justice concurred with the result but concluded the record was inadequate to resolve the legal issue, while two others dissented.

Plaintiff sued the maker of a mobile scaffold which collapsed. Defendant served an expert report that relied in part on government (OSHA) and industry (ANSI) standards. Plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of compliance with those standards, relying mainly on Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., 528 A.2d 590 (Pa. 1987), which excluded such evidence in strict liability cases. But Defendant argued the Supreme Court’s later ruling in Tincher v. Omega Flex, 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014), undermined Lewis by overruling Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978), a decision that had taken an extremely narrow view of the relevant facts in strict liability claims under section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. Tincher held that section 402A remained Pennsylvania law but “overruled Azzarello’s narrow construction . . . that prevented the jury from considering negligence-related rhetoric and concepts . . . .” Nevertheless, the trial court in Sullivan granted the motion in limine and an appellate court affirmed. Sullivan v. Werner Co., 253 A.3d 730 (Pa. Super. 2021).

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EU Reaches Legislative Deal on Proposed ‘Digital Age’ Updates to Product Liability Directive

Last week, the European Union made a significant breakthrough towards its goal of overhauling the 40-year-old Product Liability Directive for the demands of the “digital” age and modern economy. To amend the directive, the elected European Parliament and the European Council (comprised of government representatives of the 28 member states) must agree on final language and separately pass the draft legislation through their respective bodies. After extensive legislative efforts and negotiations, the European Council (currently led by the Government of Spain) and the European Parliament issued press releases announcing that they have reached a political agreement regarding the proposed updates to the directive.

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In Case You Missed It – Summer 2023

Catch up on the latest developments of interest for product manufacturers. Here’s a quarterly compilation of the most popular blog posts on Faegre Drinker on Products.

Experts Who Cannot Articulate a Standard Cannot Opine That a Defendant Failed to Meet the Standard

By Eric M. Friedman

Burns v. Sherwin-Williams Co. is the latest in a line of cases that apply variations on a simple, common-sense theme — an expert who cannot articulate the applicable standard should not be allowed to opine that a defendant failed to meet the applicable standard. Such testimony is not a “shaky but admissible” opinion to be attacked on cross-examination; it is internally inconsistent, is inherently unreliable, and should be excluded under Rule 702.

Courts Are Citing the Rule 702 Amendments — And Litigants Should, Too

By Christin Jaye Eaton and Eric M. Friedman

Though the pending amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 have not officially taken effect yet, courts already have begun to cite them, echoing the Advisory Committee’s sentiment that the amendments will not change the substance of the law as it was meant to be applied, but that many courts have not been applying it correctly. Litigants should follow suit, citing both the amendments and the Advisory Committee’s notes to alert courts that old precedent — particularly “weight, not admissibility” cases — may not be consistent with newly amended Rule 702.

Can a Treating Physician Opine on Causation? Eleventh Circuit Says It’s About Intent, Not Content

By Eric M. Friedman and Ross W. Johnson

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires witnesses who are “retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case” — i.e., “retained” experts — to prepare and sign a report that discloses “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.” In contrast, Rule 26(a)(2)(C) imposes less arduous disclosure requirements on non-retained experts and calls on the party, not the expert, to make those disclosures. As the Eleventh Circuit recently noted in Cedant v. United States, “an expert’s status as a retained witness depends on the original purpose of his retention.” As was the case before Cedant, litigants would be wise to support critical elements of their claims and defenses with testimony from a retained expert and not assume a court will allow a non-retained expert to supply what is needed.

Experts Who Cannot Articulate a Standard Cannot Opine that a Defendant Failed to Meet the Standard

If you don’t know where a line is, you can’t say whether someone has crossed it. That principle applies in spades to expert witnesses, particularly when their role in the case calls on them to help the jury understand where the lines are drawn in their field. Thus, for example, a toxicology expert who cannot say how much chemical exposure is required to produce a toxic effect cannot opine that the plaintiff’s exposure was sufficient to cause that effect. Likewise, an expert who criticizes a product’s warnings but cannot articulate an adequate warning does not pass muster under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See, e.g., Bourelle v. Crown Equip. Corp., 220 F.3d 532, 538-39 (7th Cir. 2000).

The Seventh Circuit recently gave yet another illustration of this principle at work. In Burns v. Sherwin-Williams Co., — F.4th —, 2023 WL 5210857 (7th Cir. 2023), a plaintiff truck driver was injured while making a delivery at defendant’s store using a “walkie” (i.e., an electric forklift that the operator walks behind) owned by defendant. Plaintiff was backing the walkie down a ramp and toward a dumpster with pallets laying on the ground nearby. Unfortunately, he underestimated the walkie’s stopping distance. He tried “plugging” – i.e., pushing the thumb switch in the opposite direction to slow and then reverse the walkie – and then engaged the emergency brake, but it was too late. He trapped his foot against the pallets, then fell over and broke his ankle.

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