Eric M. Friedman, Author at Faegre Drinker on Products

Eric M. Friedman

Eric Friedman guides clients through all stages of product liability litigation, particularly working with expert witnesses to present the science behind clients' products. By leaning on his pre-law history as a biochemist, he is able to identify key arguments for and against clients and craft winning strategies for both motion practice and trial.

View the full bio for Eric M. Friedman at the Faegre Drinker website.

Articles by Eric M. Friedman:

Paraquat MDL Lone Pine Order Creates New Hurdles for Nonsettling Plaintiffs

The multidistrict litigation (MDL) concerning paraquat-based herbicides — In re: Paraquat Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 3004 (S.D. Ill.) — has become a focal point in mass torts. Thousands of plaintiffs allege that exposure to paraquat caused them to develop Parkinson’s disease (PD). The litigation has featured high-stakes scientific disputes, key defense wins, a master settlement agreement, and now Case Management Order No. 25 (CMO 25, 2026 WL 1707147), a Lone Pine order with important implications for nonsettling plaintiffs and a potential roadmap for effective case management in other MDLs.

In April 2024, the MDL court excluded the plaintiffs’ sole expert on general causation. That ruling left the plaintiffs unable to establish general causation, and the court accordingly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. But that ruling only formally applied to the four bellwether cases; while the bellwether plaintiffs’ inability to establish general causation portended problems for every plaintiff in the MDL, the litigation continued.

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Treat Your AI Like an Opposing Expert: Rule 702 Lessons for Evaluating AI Output

Attorneys using generative AI can borrow a familiar litigation skill: Evaluate AI-generated output the way they would evaluate an opposing expert witness opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. An expert witness cannot simply “waltz into the courtroom and render opinions” without adequate foundation. Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 759 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999). Nor can an expert bridge the gap between data and conclusion with nothing more than ipse dixit — the expert’s own say-so. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).

Rule 702 imposes that discipline directly. It requires expert testimony to be “based on sufficient facts or data,” be “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and reflect “a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” So, when an opposing expert offers an opinion, a litigator’s instinct is not to accept it but to probe its basis and reliability.

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Causation Conundrums: Implications of Georgia Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Statute of Repose in Long-Term Product Use Cases

When does the statute of repose clock start ticking on a product liability claim involving long-term repeat use of many individually purchased units of a product? According to the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Burroughs v. Strength of Nature Global, LLC, __ S.E.2d __, 2025 WL 2918923 (Ga. Oct. 15, 2025), the short answer is that the statute of repose starts anew for each individual unit. But, as Burroughs itself illustrates, that answer creates serious problems that may require the state’s legislature to intervene.

The Burroughs plaintiff alleged she developed uterine fibroids as a result of using chemical hair relaxers manufactured by the defendants repeatedly over nearly two decades. Specifically, she claimed she began using the products in 1995 at the age of six and used them six to eight times per year through 2014 (with one brief hiatus). She developed uterine fibroids in 2018 and filed suit in 2022. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s strict liability claims on the basis that they were barred by the statute of repose. Georgia’s product liability statute of repose requires actions to be commenced within 10 years of “the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury.” OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2) (emphasis added). The trial court denied defendants’ motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding the plaintiff’s initial purchase of the first unit of the defendants’ products was a “first sale” that triggered the statute of repose and barred her filing an action more than 10 years later.

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Close, But Not Quite: Eastern District of North Carolina Excludes Experts Whose General Expertise Does Not Enable Specific Opinions Offered

Even “[a] supremely qualified expert cannot waltz into the courtroom and render opinions” unless those opinions pass muster under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 759 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999). As a recent case from the Eastern District of North Carolina illustrates, this principle is at play not only when critiquing an expert’s methodology, but also the expert’s expertise.

In Williams v. Sig Sauer, Inc., — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2643400 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 8, 2025), the plaintiff was an “enforcer” for his motorcycle club who “protect[ed]” and “monitor[ed]” the club members. He alleged that his pistol discharged and injured him while he was adjusting his position on his motorcycle. In support of his product liability claims against the manufacturer of the pistol, he proffered two expert witnesses: a gunsmith and a mechanical engineer. The defendant moved to exclude both experts and filed a motion for summary judgment.

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Nothing Shocking Here – Eleventh Circuit Affirms Defense Win in Electroconvulsive Therapy Case

When a case involves electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), one might think it originated out of the Twilight Zone. Despite the misrepresentation of such therapies in popular media, modern ECT serves as a valuable option for patients with certain severe mental health conditions who have tried other therapies without success. Although ECT is far safer today than it was when the stigma attached to it was formed, it still carries risks such as confusion, memory loss, and some physical side effects. One need not enter another dimension to envision why a plaintiff might claim damages arising from those risks. Much like Rod Serling’s anthology, the Eleventh Circuit recently closed the door on one such episode.

In Thelen v. Somatics, LLC, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 2749888 (11th Cir.), the plaintiff suffered from depression and mental health issues so severe that he attempted to take his life numerous times in numerous ways. During a two-year span, he received 95 ECT treatments to address his conditions. He was later diagnosed with a neurocognitive disorder that caused severe memory loss.

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Standing on Shaky Ground: Product Recalls Alone Do Not Constitute an Injury in Fact

Cynics have long said that no good deed goes unpunished. Such can be the case with voluntary product recalls, which often engender litigation even by plaintiffs who have suffered no real injury and merely see an opportunity for a windfall. As we recently noted, recalls do not equate with product defects. However, plaintiffs — or their attorneys — act as though purchasing a recalled product is in itself a cause of action that justifies a lawsuit. A recent opinion from the Sixth Circuit offers yet another illustration why that reasoning is unsound and highlights how defendants can attack it early in a case. Specifically, because an allegation that the product a plaintiff purchased was recalled does not raise a plausible inference of injury in fact, a plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim premised on a recall alone.

The named plaintiffs in Ward v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 24-3387, 2025 WL 2613489 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 2025), filed a putative class action in Ohio federal court alleging that they purchased peanut butter products from lots that the defendant had voluntarily recalled following a salmonella outbreak that had affected 16 people across 12 states. The plaintiffs did not, however, allege that any sampling or testing had revealed the presence of salmonella in the products they purchased. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of Article III standing, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked an injury in fact, and the district court granted the motion.

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