Eric M. Friedman

Eric Friedman guides clients through all stages of product liability litigation, particularly working with expert witnesses to present the science behind clients' products. By leaning on his pre-law history as a biochemist, he is able to identify key arguments for and against clients and craft winning strategies for both motion practice and trial.

View the full bio for Eric M. Friedman at the Faegre Drinker website.

Articles by Eric M. Friedman:


Ayotte v. National Basketball Association: Plaintiff Can’t Hide the Ball on Communications Between Counsel and Non-Retained Treater Expert

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Picture a deposition of a plaintiff’s treating physician. Early in the deposition, defense counsel asks the usual questions about the physician’s communications with the plaintiff’s counsel. But the plaintiff’s counsel, claiming that the physician is a non-retained expert whom the plaintiff’s counsel represents in connection with the action, objects on the basis of privilege and instructs the physician not to answer. That can’t be right, but exactly why not? And if such communications are discoverable, then why wouldn’t communications between defense counsel and a corporate defendant’s employee who is designated as a non-retained expert be discoverable as well? A recent order from the Southern District of New York offers clarity.

In Ayotte v. National Basketball Association, 2024 WL 3409027 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 15, 2024), the plaintiffs designated a treating psychologist as a non-retained expert and claimed he was represented in connection with the action by the plaintiffs’ counsel. Thus, when the defendant sought to discover communications between the plaintiffs’ counsel and the treating psychologist, the plaintiffs argued they were privileged.

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Plaintiffs’ Second Bite at the General Causation Apple Fares No Better Than the First in Acetaminophen MDL

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In December 2023, back when the ink was still drying on the amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Southern District of New York excluded all five general causation experts proffered by plaintiffs in the In re Acetaminophen MDL whose cases had been selected for trial.  We discussed that impressively detailed and painstaking decision here. Observing that all 50 states require proof of general causation in product liability cases and that the plaintiffs now had no experts to carry that water, the court instituted an order to show cause process that led to the dismissal of approximately 550 cases. However, over the defendants’ objections, the court permitted a small handful of new arrivals to the MDL to name their own general causation expert and try again. In yet another impressively meticulous opinion, the court recently doubled down on its Rule 702 “gatekeeping” role and excluded the new plaintiffs’ backup general causation expert in In re Acetaminophen – ASD-ADHD Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 22MC3043 (DLC), 2024 WL 3357608 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2024).

The plaintiffs in In re Acetaminophen allege that prenatal use of acetaminophen caused attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and/or autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in offspring. The plaintiffs’ first five proffered general causation experts were excluded in part because the court took issue with the experts’ “transdiagnostic” approach — combining literature of ADHD and ASD into a single analysis — because it merely “obscured limitations in the scientific literature.”   The new plaintiffs’ expert — number six overall — sidestepped the “transdiagnostic” issues and sought to opine solely on a supposed link between prenatal acetaminophen use and ADHD.  But the court, still mindful of acetaminophen’s critical role as the only pain reliever and fever reducer indicated for use during pregnancy and the FDA’s multiple reviews of its safety, remained vigilant in its Rule 702 obligation.

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Georgia Court of Appeals Confirms “First Sale” as Used in Statute of Repose Refers to Sale of First Unit of Repeatedly Purchased Products

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Georgia’s product liability statute of repose requires actions to be commenced within 10 years of “the date of the first sale for use or consumption” of the product at issue. OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2) (emphasis added). While the concept of “first sale” is clear and intuitive in the context of a product that may be sold and then later resold, it may be somewhat less clear as applied to a consumable product that is purchased repeatedly over a lengthy period of time. Is the “first sale” of such a product the earliest transaction by which the plaintiff ever obtained the product, or does “first sale” merely refer to the initial purchase of each individual unit of the product as opposed to any subsequent resales? The Georgia Court of Appeals recently clarified that it is the former – “first sale,” for purposes of the statute of repose, refers to the “first sale” of any unit of the product to the plaintiff. Thus, subsequent purchases of a new unit of the product do not come with their own fresh repose periods.

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Peer Review Can’t Save “Junk Science” from FRE 702 Judicial Gatekeeping – In re: Roundup Court Excludes Expert Whose Opinions Had Been Published in Peer-Reviewed Literature

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When tasked with assessing the admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, courts often cite the so-called Daubert factors as criteria that guide the inquiry.  Among those factors is “whether the [expert’s] theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication.”  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  The Daubert Court observed that, although publication “is not a sine qua non of admissibility,” peer review “increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.”  But peer review is not coterminous with the Rule 702 inquiry that federal courts are called upon to make, especially with the rise of so-called predatory publishing and journals with relaxed (or absent) peer review processes.  As one court recently observed, “a court can’t wave junk science through the Daubert gate simply because it survived some prepublication peer-review process.”  In re: Roundup Products Liability Litigation, 2024 WL 3074376 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2024).

In In re: Roundup, the plaintiff claimed to have developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma (NHL) as a result of using the defendant’s herbicide.  In support of that claim, he offered a single expert on the issue of whether glyphosate, the active ingredient in the herbicide, can cause NHL in humans.  The expert’s opinions were all contained in two peer-reviewed and published articles that the expert had co-authored.  But only one of the two—a 2019 meta-analysis of six epidemiological studies addressing the link between glyphosate and NHL, which had been published before the expert became involved in the litigation—grappled with the available epidemiological evidence.  The defendant attacked that paper on multiple grounds, and the court agreed that it constituted “junk science” with several flaws each independently justifying its exclusion.

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Northern District of Illinois Holds that Seventh Circuit Precedent is Incompatible with Rule 702 as Amended

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In explaining the December 2023 amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Advisory Committee called out several ways in which “many courts” had “incorrectly” applied Rule 702 and failed to adequately discharge their duty as gatekeepers with regard to expert witness testimony.  The import of those comments is that existing precedent on Rule 702 may be “incorrect” and must be re-examined.

A case pending in the Northern District of Illinois serves as a fine illustration of how this re-examination should work in practice.  In West v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2024 WL 1834112 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2024), the plaintiff alleged that she was injured when portions of a store display fell on her.  She offered a trio of experts to opine that her claimed injuries had been caused by the incident, but none of them “were aware of, let alone reviewed, [her] highly salient medical history prior to issuing their causation opinions.”  Rather, they were treating physicians who based their opinions solely on their post-incident treatment of the plaintiff.

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Washington Appellate Court Holds Statute of Repose Constitutional and Applicable in All Cases Applying Its Product Liability Act

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Statutes of repose serve as substantive outer limits on product liability claims after a certain time period following the product’s sale or use, potentially providing a complete defense in some jurisdictions and a rebuttable presumption of non-defectiveness in others.  But for a statute of repose to provide a viable defense, it must apply to the case at hand and survive constitutional scrutiny.  A recent appellate decision from Washington State provides good news on both fronts for defendants facing claims brought under the Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA).

In Erickson v. Pharmacia LLC, – P.3d –, 2024 WL 1905209 (Wash. Ct. App. May 1, 2024), three former teachers alleged injury from chemical exposure in middle school buildings built in the 1960s.  In 2018, the teachers filed product liability claims under the WPLA alleging that the chemicals at issue were not reasonably safe as designed and led to various adverse medical effects.  Because the plaintiffs had filed under the WPLA and the defendants did not contest that selection, the WPLA provided the substantive law governing the claims.  When the defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds that the claims were time-barred under the statute of repose contained in the WPLA, the plaintiffs argued that Missouri law (which has no statute of repose for product liability claims) should apply. The plaintiffs pointed to the fact that the chemicals were manufactured in Missouri and the manufacturer also had its principal place of business in Missouri.  The trial court agreed, and the case proceeded to a nine-figure jury verdict in the plaintiffs’ favor.

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