In the wake of March Madness, it is only appropriate to call attention to an opinion laced with pithy basketball puns. In Nachimovsky v. Nike, Inc. et al., 2022 WL 943421 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2022), Plaintiff injured his knee during a recreational basketball game. Blaming this injury on his new sneakers, he called foul and brought claims for negligence and products liability—specifically design defect—against Nike, which designed and manufactured the sneakers, and Shoe Fitters, which sold the sneakers.
To support his claims, Plaintiff proffered two one-page letters from a podiatrist who concluded that the sneakers were defective and a “major contributing factor” to Plaintiff’s injury. Nike (and Shoe Fitters, by incorporation) responded with a full-court press, seeking to exclude the podiatrist’s opinions under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, arguing that they were not reliable and he was not qualified to offer them.
As to qualifications, Plaintiff responded that the podiatrist was board certified, with 35 years of experience, and had designed high-end men’s dress shoes and “an expensive pair of men’s sneakers.” But the court deemed the expert unqualified, because (1) Plaintiff failed to submit a curriculum vitae or any other documentation substantiating the podiatrist’s claimed qualifications, and (2) the podiatrist’s limited experience designing high-end dress shoes and one expensive pair of sneakers did not qualify him to opine on the design of the basketball sneakers at issue.
The court also determined that the podiatrist’s methodology was not reliable. Plaintiff argued that the “technical method” of testing the look, feel, wear, and twist of Plaintiff’s sneakers allowed the podiatrist to conclude that the sneakers’ “excessively narrow” arch gave insufficient support to Plaintiff’s foot. But Plaintiff provided no documentation to support this “technical method,” nor was the podiatrist able to show that this methodology was generally accepted, subject to peer review, or accurate in determining whether a shoe was defectively designed. The podiatrist “simply present[ed] his conclusions without any supporting factual basis.”
Nike and Shoe Fitters moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims, all of which required proof of causation. With evidence from his expert podiatrist excluded, Plaintiff pointed to written reports from volunteers who had tested pre-production models of the sneakers at issue. He claimed that this circumstantial evidence was enough to establish causation. The court, however, blew the whistle, reminding Plaintiff that such evidence is only acceptable where a plaintiff cannot identify a specific flaw and is able to exclude all causes for the product’s failure that are not attributable to the defendants. The court held that Plaintiff failed both of these requirements, meaning he had neither expert opinion nor circumstantial evidence to satisfy his burden to show causation. The court, therefore, granted summary judgment.
While it is no surprise that Plaintiff’s shoddy offense couldn’t bring home a win, we would be remiss not to mention the court’s stern reproach of Plaintiff’s podiatrist, whom it characterized as partisan, sacrificing objectivity for the need to win. We leave you with an excerpt the court borrowed from Lord MacMillan, asserting that a scientific expert “ought never to accept a retainer to advocate in evidence a particular view merely because it is the view which is in the interests of the party who has retained him to maintain. To do so is to prostitute science and to practice a fraud on the administration of justice.”
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