Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) requires retained expert witnesses to provide an expert report which gives “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i). If a party fails to disclose information required under Rule 26(a)(2), “the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). As a plaintiff in the Western District of Washington recently learned, failure to adhere to Rule 26 can be fatal to a case.
It is not often that a federal district court limits an expert witness’s proffered testimony on the ground that the expert is not qualified to offer it, and it is also uncommon for a court to exclude expert testimony on the ground that it would not assist the trier of fact. However, the Western District of Louisiana recently limited a proffered engineering expert’s testimony on both of those grounds.
In Terral River Service, Inc. v. SCF Marine, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00406, Plaintiff purchased a barge from Defendant and later found it partially submerged due to a fracture in the bow. The parties disputed the timing of the fracture, with Plaintiff alleging that it existed prior to delivery of the barge. Plaintiff offered as an expert witness a metallurgical and mechanical engineer with experience in evaluating barge fractures.
The Florida Supreme Court will abandon the state’s previous summary judgment standard in favor of the federal standard — a familiar, achievable standard to dispose of claims that are unsupported by evidence. For pending dispositive motion practice that may be decided during the gap period before the rule amendment takes effect, movants should consider requesting that any decision be made without prejudice to seek summary judgment under the new summary judgment standard once it takes effect.
On December 8, 2020, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Southern District of New York’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Bayer — and resulting closure of all cases against Bayer — in the Mirena multidistrict litigation (MDL). In re Mirena IUS Levonorgestrel-Related Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II), No. 19-2155, 2020 WL 7214264 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2020).
In the MDL, the plaintiffs alleged that the Mirena Intrauterine System had caused them to develop idiopathic intracranial hypertension (IIH). The District Court elected to focus first on whether the plaintiffs had evidence sufficient to establish general causation. The District Court held a Daubert hearing that lasted three days and featured testimony by 19 general causation witnesses — 7 for the plaintiffs and 12 for Bayer. On October 24, 2018, the District Court entered a detailed 156-page opinion granting Bayer’s Daubert motion as to all of the plaintiffs’ experts and denying as moot plaintiffs’ motion to preclude Bayer’s experts. In re Mirena IUS Levonorgestrel-Related Prods. Liab. Litig., 341 F. Supp. 3d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Bayer then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court granted for lack of general causation and dismissed all cases in the Mirena MDL.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has retired the inflexible Frye-Reed standard and adopted the framework of Daubert for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony. In Rochkind v. Stevenson (August 28, 2020), Maryland officially joined the supermajority of states that have considered the issue and now follow Daubert.
In Little v. Kia Motors America, Inc., docket no. A-24-18, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently set out the examination New Jersey courts must undertake before admitting aggregate proof of damages, rather than individualized proof, in a class action. Siding with defendant Kia in a vehicle defect suit, the Court ruled that admission of aggregate proof of damages at trial was inappropriate because an unknown number of class members would have received a windfall, and the formula used to estimate such damages was unreliable. This case reviews the key principles courts and litigants should consider when choosing between individualized or aggregate proof of damages in a class action.