As noted in two prior posts, one on May 15, 2020, and the other on May 29, 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting explosion in the use of remote depositions present a number of novel issues for lawyers to consider, whether taking or defending depositions. Regardless of these “unprecedented times,” some things remain the same, including that it is improper for a witness to be coached about answers while the deposition is occurring.
On December 8, 2020, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Southern District of New York’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Bayer — and resulting closure of all cases against Bayer — in the Mirena multidistrict litigation (MDL). In re Mirena IUS Levonorgestrel-Related Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II), No. 19-2155, 2020 WL 7214264 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2020).
In the MDL, the plaintiffs alleged that the Mirena Intrauterine System had caused them to develop idiopathic intracranial hypertension (IIH). The District Court elected to focus first on whether the plaintiffs had evidence sufficient to establish general causation. The District Court held a Daubert hearing that lasted three days and featured testimony by 19 general causation witnesses — 7 for the plaintiffs and 12 for Bayer. On October 24, 2018, the District Court entered a detailed 156-page opinion granting Bayer’s Daubert motion as to all of the plaintiffs’ experts and denying as moot plaintiffs’ motion to preclude Bayer’s experts. In re Mirena IUS Levonorgestrel-Related Prods. Liab. Litig., 341 F. Supp. 3d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Bayer then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court granted for lack of general causation and dismissed all cases in the Mirena MDL.
The Northern District of California recently dismissed a Plaintiff’s claim that the term “vanilla” was misleading on the label of a soymilk product, but left the proverbial door open for the filing of an amended pleading.
In Clark v. Westbrae Natural, Inc., Case No. 20-cv-03221, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s use of the word “vanilla” on the label of its organic unsweetened soymilk misrepresented to consumers that the product’s vanilla flavor was derived exclusively from the vanilla bean plant. Gas chromatography‒mass spectrometry analyses showed that the flavor came from a non-vanilla source. Plaintiff alleged he would not have purchased the product had he realized the flavor was not derived from the vanilla bean, and asserted claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Law, and Consumers Legal Remedies Act. He argued that the product should be labeled “artificially flavored.”
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) released new draft guidance, Biosimilarity and Interchangeability: Additional Draft Q&As on Biosimilar Development and the BPCI Act, intended for prospective applicants of biologics license applications (BLAs) for biosimilar and interchangeable products, and for other parties interested in the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCI Act). This new guidance aims to further facilitate the development of proposed biosimilar products and proposed interchangeable products.
The BPCI Act created an abbreviated licensure pathway for biological products shown to be biosimilar to, or interchangeable with, an FDA-licensed biological reference product. This newly released draft guidance is the third FDA question-and-answer guidance on the BPCI Act, with the previous two released in December 2018: Questions and Answers on Biosimilar Development and the BPCI Act Guidance for Industry and New and Revised Draft Q&As on Biosimilar Development and the BPCI Act (Revision 2).
Earlier this year, the California Court of Appeals in Mize v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 51 Cal.App.5th 850 (2020), reversed a trial court’s dismissal of failure to warn and other claims against a medical device manufacturer, holding that “California law recognizes a manufacturer’s duty to warn the [U.S. Food and Drug Administration] of adverse events.” Mize concluded that California’s duty to warn FDA was “parallel” to the requirements of federal law, and therefore not expressly preempted.
Cases like Mize involving medical devices approved for sale through the FDA’s Premarket Approval (PMA) process are generally subject to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312 (2008). Riegel held that the federal Medical Device Amendments preempt state tort laws if they are “different from, or in addition to” the requirements imposed by federal law. Riegel bars state tort law claims because PMA devices are subject to specific requirements adopted by FDA through the rigorous PMA approval process. However, Riegel left open the possibility, based on an articulated judicially imposed policy, that a state might “[provide] a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations” because “the state duties in such a case ‘parallel’ federal law.” 552 U.S. at 329.