We think Lone Pine orders are pretty fair. Lone Pine orders are case management orders that require plaintiffs in multidistrict litigation (MDL) to produce specific evidence without which the plaintiffs cannot make a prima facie case. There is nothing unfair about dismissing a case that is fatally flawed for want of critical evidence that cannot be obtained. Yet Lone Pine orders rarely sit well with plaintiffs who cannot (or do not want to have to) make the showing required of them. Rather than accept their fate, these plaintiffs often attack the Lone Pine order in an effort to delay the inevitable. We discussed one such effort in the In re Zostavax MDL in 2022 and earlier this year. The In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) MDL now provides another example, not only of how plaintiffs attack Lone Pine orders but also of how courts should respond to these unmerited attacks. In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prods. Liab. Litig., 2024 WL 4362982 (E.D. La. Oct. 1, 2024).
Category: Civil Procedure
Third Circuit Affirms Lone Pine Order and Ensuing Dismissals in In re Zostavax MDL
In March 2022, the In re Zostavax MDL court entered a Lone Pine order requiring plaintiffs who claimed to have developed shingles as a result of using the Zostavax vaccine to produce certain test results supporting causation. In December 2022, the court dismissed 1,189 cases for failure to comply with that Lone Pine order. We posted about the Lone Pine order in April 2022 and the dismissal order in December of the same year. Now, on appeal, the Third Circuit has affirmed both the Lone Pine order and the dismissal. In re: Zostavax (Zoster Vaccine Live) Prods. Liab. Litig., 2024 WL 3423709 (3d Cir. July 16, 2024).
Zostavax is a vaccine meant to prevent shingles, a viral infection caused by the varicella-zoster virus (VZV). The vaccine introduces a weakened strain of VZV, triggering an immune response that primes the recipient’s immune system against non-vaccine sources of VZV (i.e., “wild-type strains”). VZV is responsible for both shingles and chickenpox, and it remains in the body for life. As a result, everyone who had chickenpox as a child faces a risk of the virus reactivating and causing shingles in adulthood. A laboratory test (called a “PCR test”) can reliably distinguish between the strain of VZV used in Zostavax and the wild-type strain one would find due to chickenpox infection.
Ayotte v. National Basketball Association: Plaintiff Can’t Hide the Ball on Communications Between Counsel and Non-Retained Treater Expert
Picture a deposition of a plaintiff’s treating physician. Early in the deposition, defense counsel asks the usual questions about the physician’s communications with the plaintiff’s counsel. But the plaintiff’s counsel, claiming that the physician is a non-retained expert whom the plaintiff’s counsel represents in connection with the action, objects on the basis of privilege and instructs the physician not to answer. That can’t be right, but exactly why not? And if such communications are discoverable, then why wouldn’t communications between defense counsel and a corporate defendant’s employee who is designated as a non-retained expert be discoverable as well? A recent order from the Southern District of New York offers clarity.
In Ayotte v. National Basketball Association, 2024 WL 3409027 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 15, 2024), the plaintiffs designated a treating psychologist as a non-retained expert and claimed he was represented in connection with the action by the plaintiffs’ counsel. Thus, when the defendant sought to discover communications between the plaintiffs’ counsel and the treating psychologist, the plaintiffs argued they were privileged.
Upcoming Changes to Florida’s Civil Procedure Rules: What Litigators and their Clients Need to Know
Last week, the Florida Supreme Court released two opinions [here and here] announcing changes to its rules of civil procedure in an attempt “to promote the fair and timely resolution of civil cases.” The amendments are broad and apply to many aspects of case management, scheduling, and discovery. Thus, Florida practitioners will want to familiarize themselves with the new variants before they go into effect on January 1, 2025. The following discussion highlights a subset of the changes that appear most likely to have an impact throughout a case’s lifetime.
Litigators will feel the impact right from the jump. While the current rules permit the courts more leeway when scheduling deadlines, the newly re-written Rule 1.200 will give courts 120 days to assign each case to one of three case management tracks—complex, general, or streamlined. The court may customize the process according to its needs, but the judge must set an actual or projected trial period according to the specified case management track. These buffed requirements will provide litigants with clearer expectations in their case’s timeline, and other changes work to ensure those dates—including trial—are delayed as little as possible. For example, under the modified Rule 1.200, attorneys must follow specific steps to modify case management deadlines, otherwise deadlines “must be strictly enforced unless changed by court order.” Moreover, one noteworthy change to Rule 1.460 provides that “motions to continue trial are disfavored and should be rarely granted and then only upon good cause shown.” [No. SC2023-0962 at 7–8.]
How to Succeed in Business (in Philadelphia) Without Really Trying (Your Case There, Because Venue Isn’t Proper)
Venue rulings in Pennsylvania affect many defendants in products cases. Those incorporated here, and those sued on allegations that their products caused harm here, of course. And, for now at least, it includes corporate defendants registered to do business in Pennsylvania. They are subject to general jurisdiction, including for claims unrelated to the Commonwealth, under Pennsylvania’s unique “consent to jurisdiction” statute. That statute was upheld as consistent with due process in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 600 U.S. 122 (2023).
And with many serious personal injury cases being filed in Philadelphia – a venue described in a Mallory concurring opinion as “reputed to be especially favorable to tort plaintiffs” – the stakes involved in venue disputes are higher than ever. That is even more evident after several recently reported verdicts in product cases, one approaching $1 billion and one exceeding $2 billion.
In Case You Missed It – Summer 2023
Catch up on the latest developments of interest for product manufacturers. Here’s a quarterly compilation of the most popular blog posts on Faegre Drinker on Products.
Experts Who Cannot Articulate a Standard Cannot Opine That a Defendant Failed to Meet the Standard
By Eric M. Friedman
Burns v. Sherwin-Williams Co. is the latest in a line of cases that apply variations on a simple, common-sense theme — an expert who cannot articulate the applicable standard should not be allowed to opine that a defendant failed to meet the applicable standard. Such testimony is not a “shaky but admissible” opinion to be attacked on cross-examination; it is internally inconsistent, is inherently unreliable, and should be excluded under Rule 702.
Courts Are Citing the Rule 702 Amendments — And Litigants Should, Too
By Christin Jaye Eaton and Eric M. Friedman
Though the pending amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 have not officially taken effect yet, courts already have begun to cite them, echoing the Advisory Committee’s sentiment that the amendments will not change the substance of the law as it was meant to be applied, but that many courts have not been applying it correctly. Litigants should follow suit, citing both the amendments and the Advisory Committee’s notes to alert courts that old precedent — particularly “weight, not admissibility” cases — may not be consistent with newly amended Rule 702.
Can a Treating Physician Opine on Causation? Eleventh Circuit Says It’s About Intent, Not Content
By Eric M. Friedman and Ross W. Johnson
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires witnesses who are “retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case” — i.e., “retained” experts — to prepare and sign a report that discloses “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.” In contrast, Rule 26(a)(2)(C) imposes less arduous disclosure requirements on non-retained experts and calls on the party, not the expert, to make those disclosures. As the Eleventh Circuit recently noted in Cedant v. United States, “an expert’s status as a retained witness depends on the original purpose of his retention.” As was the case before Cedant, litigants would be wise to support critical elements of their claims and defenses with testimony from a retained expert and not assume a court will allow a non-retained expert to supply what is needed.