Class certification decisions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mark a critical stage in any putative class action lawsuit. Rule 23(a) requires plaintiffs to prove, among other things, that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” And Rule 23(b) authorizes money damages class actions only where the legal or factual questions common to the class predominate over questions that may be addressed differently for individual class members. In class actions involving claims about product performance, class proponents almost always cite the existence of a “defect” as common issue. But why is the generic question of “defect” even the right question, and what if the product has experienced a significant change over the time period covered by the class action? When a product is updated, is it still the same “product” for purposes of Rule 23? The Sixth Circuit, in In re: Nissan North America, Inc., — F.4th —, 2024 WL 4864339 (6th Cir. 2024), addressed not only these questions but also joined the growing list of circuits that expressly require expert testimony offered at the class certification stage to satisfy Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Category: Civil Procedure
To Depose or Not to Depose: When Challenging Opposing Nonretained Experts Becomes Challenging
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) requires parties to disclose the opinions of experts who may present evidence at trial. If the disclosures are inadequate, Rule 37(c) requires exclusion of the opinions “unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” This almost automatic exclusionary rule can pose issues when deciding whether to depose an opposing expert. Although “Rule 26(a)(2) does not allow parties to cure deficient expert reports by supplementing them with later deposition testimony,” Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 2008), some courts nevertheless may consider an inadequate disclosure to be “harmless” once the expert’s opinions have been fully explored at deposition. On the other hand, although “[c]ourts have uniformly rejected the [idea] that the failure to depose an expert affects the right to object to the expert’s testimony,” Hinton v. Outboard Marine Corp., 828 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 (D. Me. 2011) (collecting cases), a party may need to depose an opposing expert in order to properly set up a challenge to the expert’s opinions for purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or trial if the court deems the expert’s disclosure adequate. This issue becomes particularly acute as applied to nonretained experts, who need not provide a written report under Rule 26. A recent opinion from the Northern District of Indiana aptly illustrates the quandary.
In Macchia v. Landline Trans, LLC, No. 2:21-CV-398, 2024 WL 4751091 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 12, 2024), the plaintiff alleged that he was injured in a motor vehicle accident and proffered three of his treating physicians as experts to opine on his injuries and causation. The defendants filed a three-pronged motion to exclude the experts. Notably, the defendants elected not to take the depositions of any of the three physicians. Indeed, the court’s opinion repeatedly observed how the lack of deposition testimony made it “a bit of a challenge” to summarize the background facts and adjudicate the motion.
A Change Is Gonna Come — Amendments to California Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication Procedures Take Effect January 1, 2025
Those who litigate in California state courts, take note: Changes are coming to the state’s summary judgment statute for the first time in 20 years. Assembly Bill 2049 (AB 2049), signed into law this summer, introduces logistical changes and clarifications to the summary judgment process that attorneys should be aware of before the law takes effect on January 1, 2025.
First, AB 2049 will change the notice period — and thus the timing — of summary judgment and summary adjudication motions. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c prescribes the timeline for summary judgment and summary adjudication motions. Under the longstanding statute: notice of a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion and supporting papers needed to be served at least 75 days before the hearing, oppositions were due at least 14 days before the hearing, and replies at least five days before the hearing.
In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) MDL Court Rejects Plaintiffs’ Argument that Lone Pine Order is Unfair
We think Lone Pine orders are pretty fair. Lone Pine orders are case management orders that require plaintiffs in multidistrict litigation (MDL) to produce specific evidence without which the plaintiffs cannot make a prima facie case. There is nothing unfair about dismissing a case that is fatally flawed for want of critical evidence that cannot be obtained. Yet Lone Pine orders rarely sit well with plaintiffs who cannot (or do not want to have to) make the showing required of them. Rather than accept their fate, these plaintiffs often attack the Lone Pine order in an effort to delay the inevitable. We discussed one such effort in the In re Zostavax MDL in 2022 and earlier this year. The In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) MDL now provides another example, not only of how plaintiffs attack Lone Pine orders but also of how courts should respond to these unmerited attacks. In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prods. Liab. Litig., 2024 WL 4362982 (E.D. La. Oct. 1, 2024).
Third Circuit Affirms Lone Pine Order and Ensuing Dismissals in In re Zostavax MDL
In March 2022, the In re Zostavax MDL court entered a Lone Pine order requiring plaintiffs who claimed to have developed shingles as a result of using the Zostavax vaccine to produce certain test results supporting causation. In December 2022, the court dismissed 1,189 cases for failure to comply with that Lone Pine order. We posted about the Lone Pine order in April 2022 and the dismissal order in December of the same year. Now, on appeal, the Third Circuit has affirmed both the Lone Pine order and the dismissal. In re: Zostavax (Zoster Vaccine Live) Prods. Liab. Litig., 2024 WL 3423709 (3d Cir. July 16, 2024).
Zostavax is a vaccine meant to prevent shingles, a viral infection caused by the varicella-zoster virus (VZV). The vaccine introduces a weakened strain of VZV, triggering an immune response that primes the recipient’s immune system against non-vaccine sources of VZV (i.e., “wild-type strains”). VZV is responsible for both shingles and chickenpox, and it remains in the body for life. As a result, everyone who had chickenpox as a child faces a risk of the virus reactivating and causing shingles in adulthood. A laboratory test (called a “PCR test”) can reliably distinguish between the strain of VZV used in Zostavax and the wild-type strain one would find due to chickenpox infection.
Ayotte v. National Basketball Association: Plaintiff Can’t Hide the Ball on Communications Between Counsel and Non-Retained Treater Expert
Picture a deposition of a plaintiff’s treating physician. Early in the deposition, defense counsel asks the usual questions about the physician’s communications with the plaintiff’s counsel. But the plaintiff’s counsel, claiming that the physician is a non-retained expert whom the plaintiff’s counsel represents in connection with the action, objects on the basis of privilege and instructs the physician not to answer. That can’t be right, but exactly why not? And if such communications are discoverable, then why wouldn’t communications between defense counsel and a corporate defendant’s employee who is designated as a non-retained expert be discoverable as well? A recent order from the Southern District of New York offers clarity.
In Ayotte v. National Basketball Association, 2024 WL 3409027 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 15, 2024), the plaintiffs designated a treating psychologist as a non-retained expert and claimed he was represented in connection with the action by the plaintiffs’ counsel. Thus, when the defendant sought to discover communications between the plaintiffs’ counsel and the treating psychologist, the plaintiffs argued they were privileged.