The Fifth Circuit held that the 15-year Texas statute of repose barred a family’s claims regarding the rollover of a truck. The court was required to interpret the statutory language “date of the sale of the product,” finding that the repose period started when the automaker transferred the truck to the dealership, and not when it was first sold by the dealer to a customer. The court also held that the Texas tolling exception for minors does not apply to the product liability statute of repose.
On March 25, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, revisiting the issue of due process limitations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction, most recently addressed by the Court in 2017 in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1783 (2017) (“BMS”). A unanimous Court (8-0, with Justice Barrett not participating) held in Ford Motor that courts in Montana and Minnesota could hear claims by residents of those states alleging injuries sustained in accidents that occurred there involving Ford vehicles. Relying on Ford’s extensive contacts with those states, which consisted of efforts to create and serve local sales and service and repair markets for the same kinds of vehicles, the Court concluded these plaintiffs’ claims were sufficiently “related to” Ford’s local contacts, even though the actual vehicles in the accidents were designed, manufactured and initially sold in other states. (We commented here on the state court decisions in these cases before Ford sought certiorari.)
Pre-service removal—known colloquially as “snap removal”—continues to be adopted in more jurisdictions. For a basic explanation of snap removal, see Faegre Drinker’s prior posts here.
In Doe v. Daversa Partners, 2021 WL 736734, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2021), the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia joins the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal affirming the practice of snap removal. Noting that the D.C. Circuit had not yet opined on the issue, the Daversa court provided a thorough analysis and rationale for refusing remand under the circumstances.
On March 5, 2021, FDA issued a public statement announcing regulatory actions to reduce toxic elements — with a particular focus on arsenic, lead, cadmium and mercury — in food for babies and young children. FDA cited the risk heavy metals pose to infant and young children’s neurological development. The Agency indicated that it would take the following actions:
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari without comment in two cases seeking to resolve a Circuit split regarding the proof required to establish that a claim for payment was false or fraudulent under the False Claims Act.
Two Petitioners asked the Court to decide whether the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, requires proof of “objective falsity”, or whether a plaintiff expert’s opinion that differs from the judgment of the defendant is sufficient to show a claim for payment was false or fraudulent under the FCA. Both cases involved allegations that a physician’s certification of medical necessity for hospice services was false, and therefore sufficient to prove plaintiffs’ FCA claims.
The Ninth Circuit has confirmed in quadrophonic sound that plaintiffs cannot avoid preemption by relying on vague and speculative allegations to establish a parallel claim. The court affirmed the dismissal of four lawsuits by plaintiffs claiming they were injured by breast implants on the grounds that their claims are barred by the 1976 Medical Device Amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (MDA). Sewell v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, et al., no. 19-56393; Vieira v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, et al., no. 19-56394; Billetts v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, et al., no. 19-56398; Nunn v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, et al., no. 19-56391.
In each case, California plaintiffs alleged their breast implants were defective and caused them to experience fatigue, muscle pain, and migraines. The district courts dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim on grounds of preemption, and plaintiffs appealed.