New York’s Beauty Justice Act: Sweeping Changes Proposed for Cosmetics and Personal Care Products

New York lawmakers are advancing the Beauty Justice Act, one of the most comprehensive state-level efforts in the country to regulate cosmetics and personal care products. For in-house counsel at cosmetics and personal care companies, the bill is worth tracking now because it could affect product formulation, supplier oversight, labeling, and litigation risk well before any compliance deadline. The bill responds to growing concerns over consumer exposure to chemicals linked to cancer, hormone disruption, reproductive harm, allergies, and other health risks. Supporters argue that current federal law, including the Modernization of Cosmetics Regulation Act of 2022 (MoCRA), does not go far enough. Framed as both a public health and environmental justice measure, the legislation aims to protect consumers in vulnerable communities disproportionately exposed to these products.

  1. Background

    The Beauty Justice Act remains pending before the New York Legislature; if enacted, its core product restrictions would apply beginning January 1, 2029. The bill would prohibit cosmetics and personal care products sold in New York from containing intentionally added chemicals on the bill’s restricted substances list. It would also require companies to evaluate whether ingredients listed as “fragrance,” “flavor,” “colorant,” or other functional classifications contain restricted chemicals, comply with contaminant thresholds such as lead limits, and monitor Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) rulemaking that may add substances to the restricted list over time. The bill targets numerous chemicals that have already faced scrutiny in other jurisdictions and regulatory frameworks, including per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), parabens, phthalates, certain dyes, and preservatives.

    Continue reading “New York’s Beauty Justice Act: Sweeping Changes Proposed for Cosmetics and Personal Care Products”

What’s the Catch? Interpreting the “Catch-All” Provision of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently ruled that a product vendor’s silence is not deceptive when the vendor has no duty to speak.

The “catch-all” provision of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) prohibits vendors of goods and services from “[e]ngaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.” 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi). In March 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that omissions do not count as “deceptive conduct” under the UTPCPL.

Continue reading “What’s the Catch? Interpreting the “Catch-All” Provision of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law”

Transposing the EU’s New Product Liability Directive: A Member State Progress Report

Even in the areas where the Product Liability Directive aims for full harmonisation, the EU member states’ early legislative activity reveals notable differences in implementation. Companies should continue to monitor national transposition closely and begin preparing for the new regime. Key steps include reviewing product safety documentation and post-market surveillance processes and ensuring that contractual arrangements with component suppliers and distributors adequately allocate responsibilities and risks under the revised framework.

Read the full article on the Faegre Drinker website

Treat Your AI Like an Opposing Expert: Rule 702 Lessons for Evaluating AI Output

Attorneys using generative AI can borrow a familiar litigation skill: Evaluate AI-generated output the way they would evaluate an opposing expert witness opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. An expert witness cannot simply “waltz into the courtroom and render opinions” without adequate foundation. Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 759 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999). Nor can an expert bridge the gap between data and conclusion with nothing more than ipse dixit — the expert’s own say-so. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).

Rule 702 imposes that discipline directly. It requires expert testimony to be “based on sufficient facts or data,” be “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and reflect “a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” So, when an opposing expert offers an opinion, a litigator’s instinct is not to accept it but to probe its basis and reliability.

Continue reading “Treat Your AI Like an Opposing Expert: Rule 702 Lessons for Evaluating AI Output”

In Case You Missed It: Faegre Drinker on Products — Winter 2026

Catch up on the latest developments of interest for product manufacturers. Here’s a quarterly compilation of the most popular blog posts on Faegre Drinker on Products.

Instruction Malfunction: Pennsylvania Superior Court Vacates $1B Verdict Due to Faulty Jury Instructions

By Sophia M. Landress & Benjamin R. Grossman

Preserving objections to jury instructions can be the difference between paying a significant judgment or making a plaintiff prove their case again at trial. The appellate panel held that the trial court ought to have instructed the jury properly about the crashworthiness doctrine, rather than only instructing the jury on the standard strict liability doctrine.

A Win for the Gig Economy: First Appellate Ruling on Florida’s TNC Statute Affirms Independent Contractor Protections

By Traci T. McKee, Dona Trnovska Gilliland, & Andrew J. Koehler

The TNC Statute generally shelters transportation network companies (TNCs) from vicarious liability for drivers’ actions if certain conditions are met. Abner v. Lyft Fla., Inc. not only reinforces a textual reading of the legislature’s independent contractor structure but also sets a high bar for negligent hiring claims.

Interplay Between Statutes of Repose and Statutes of Limitations in Latent Disease Exposure Claims

As toxic tort claims alleging chronic illness from alleged chemical exposure continue to rise nationwide, the recent Kansas federal court decision in Jefferies v. Harcros Chemicals Inc., 2026 WL 958172, (April 9, 2026), highlights the power of statutes of repose, which can bar latent disease claims, even when the injury is discovered decades after exposure.

Case Background

In Jefferies, plaintiffs living near the defendant’s chemical manufacturing facility alleged that years of ethylene oxide (EtO) emissions caused cancer and miscarriages, some dating back decades. However, the Kansas statute of repose imposes a strict 10-year cutoff: No claim may proceed for exposures more than 10 years before suit, regardless of when the injury came to light. Seizing on this statute, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred. Agreeing with the defendants, the court rejected arguments that the discovery rule, ongoing emissions, and a continuing duty to warn tolled the statute of repose, emphasizing that the statute is a “general grant of immunity” that abolishes claims arising outside its window.

Continue reading “Interplay Between Statutes of Repose and Statutes of Limitations in Latent Disease Exposure Claims”