Florida Courts of Appeal Scrutinizing Punitive Damages Claims

It is not uncommon for a product liability plaintiff to base a claim for punitive damages on little more than the same allegations that undergird a strict liability or negligence claim, while adding that the defendant knew that the product was unsafe or that the warnings were inadequate and marketed the product regardless. While that approach has worked at times in the past, recent decisions from Florida’s Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal remind us that Florida imposes a high bar on punitive damages claims. Specifically, these courts highlighted several key points related to claims of punitive damages in product liability cases: (1) Florida’s statutory requirements for punitive damages are more stringent than some other states (specifically, California) and, therefore, orders from other states awarding punitive damages are unpersuasive; (2) Florida law presumes a product is not defective if it complies with applicable government regulations; (3) the level of negligence required to plead punitive damages in Florida requires conduct equivalent to establishing criminal manslaughter; and (4) the Florida Supreme Court has all but eliminated punitive damage awards in product liability cases. These cases are discussed in further detail below.

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Tort Reform is Top of Mind in 2025: Legislative Updates in Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana and Arkansas

The American Tort Reform Foundation’s list of “Judicial Hellholes” often are all-too-familiar jurisdictions for product liability defendants. Some states who are home to these infamous venues, often known for producing nuclear verdicts, have recently rallied for successful tort reform. In the most recent state legislative sessions, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana and Arkansas implemented tort reform bills which may serve to neutralize the nuclear verdicts coming out of their courts.

Georgia

Following several nuclear verdicts, including a $1.7 billion verdict in Hill v. Ford Motor Co. and a $2.5 billion verdict in Brogdon v. Ford Motor Co., Georgia has recognized the impact that excessive tort costs have on Georgia’s economy and its ability to attract businesses. Georgia Governor Brian Kemp unveiled a tort reform package in early 2025 that sought to address these issues.

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Defective Logic: Why Recall Evidence Falls Short in Court

In product liability litigation, plaintiffs often treat a product recall as though it is conclusive proof that the product is defective or that its warnings are inadequate. Some plaintiffs even cite clearly inapplicable recalls — for example, lot-specific recalls spurred by a manufacturing or labeling issue that did not impact the unit that the plaintiff received — in an effort to bolster their case before a court or in settlement discussions. Federal Rule of Evidence 407’s prohibition on the use of recall evidence to prove those points seems to do little to quell the enthusiasm. Of course, Rule 407 is grounded in part on “a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.” Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee’s note. But Rule 407 is not the only grounds on which recall evidence can (and should) be excluded.

For example, in Pecan Trust v. Nexus RVs, LLC, 2025 WL 1503940 (N.D. Ind. May 27, 2025), the plaintiffs sued the manufacturers of an RV and certain component parts alleging, among other things, that a defect in the brake pressure switch represented a fire risk. In support of that claim, they pointed solely to a safety recall for the part due to a possible fire risk and an expert witness who, based on the recall alone, concluded that the issue might pose a fire risk. The parts manufacturer moved for summary judgment, and the court granted the motion as to the breach of warranty claim after concluding that the plaintiffs had not proffered sufficient evidence of a defect. As the court noted: “That a recall has occurred may be evidence of certain things—namely as a subsequent remedial measure—but it cannot show a product defect. In reality, products subject to a recall might have a defect or might not, as a recall implements a safety campaign to ensure that none do or will manifest one.” (internal citations omitted). And, as the court noted in the specific context of the warranty claim, the fact that the plaintiffs had never presented the RV for work under the recall posed a second, equally problematic obstacle to their claim.

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Fifth Circuit Clouds Threshold Dose Analysis in Ruffin v. BP

Plaintiffs in toxic tort cases must prove both general and specific causation, generally through the testimony of experts. Experts must establish that a specific chemical exposure can (and did) cause the specific injury at issue. In order to make that showing, the plaintiff’s exposure must at least have exceeded the minimum harmful level of the chemical — the “threshold dose.” As the Eleventh Circuit made clear last year in its handling of In re Deepwater Horizon BELO litigation (which we discussed here), threshold dose is a concept that straddles general and specific causation. A more recent BELO case, Ruffin v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc., — F.4th —, 2025 WL 1367185 (5th Cir. May 12, 2025), shows how isolating an expert’s general causation opinion from its implications on specific causation can cloud the analysis.

In Ruffin, the plaintiff worked for five months as a clean-up worker following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. He was diagnosed with prostate cancer five years later and sued the defendant, claiming he was exposed to chemicals that caused his cancer. He described two instances of exposure: one when oil splashed onto his face while travelling by boat and another when he fell in the water. The plaintiff had a known genetic risk for prostate cancer, but his expert claimed the oil exposures were a “second and necessary hit to initiate his prostate cancer.” The defendant moved to exclude the plaintiff’s causation expert, a genetic and molecular epidemiologist, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The district court had excluded both the expert’s general and specific causation opinions as unreliable, largely for failure to specify a threshold dose, and then granted summary judgment for want of admissible expert evidence.

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Ten Things to Know About the European Union’s New Product Liability Directive

After it was initially proposed more than two years ago, the European Union passed a new product liability directive (PLD) on Dec. 9, 2024, which prescribes a new legislative framework to expand and modify product liability laws created by the current PLD (originally enacted in 1985). As with other EU directives, the PLD sets legislative and policy goals that the EU’s 27 member states are obligated to implement into national law. For the PLD, they must do so within two years — by December 2026.

The new PLD was presented during the legislative phase as a modernization of pre-Internet Age laws from the 1980s. But beneath that exterior, the new PLD makes various substantive changes that are likely to increase litigation risk and costs for companies doing business in Europe. These changes will impact not only manufacturers of consumer products traditionally subject to product liability law, but also other businesses such as technology and software companies, which will be subjected to product liability law for the first time.

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You Can Buy Me Dinner, But Don’t Expect to Choose My Entrée: Motion to Disqualify for Non-Party Litigation Funding Conflicts of Interest

You can pay for the dinner, but you cannot pick when, where or what we’re eating. At least that’s what a Magistrate Judge in the District of New Jersey decided last week in Harish v. Arbit, No. CV 21-11088-EP-AME, 2025 WL 354434 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2025), a patent dispute that resulted in the disqualification of two law firms from representing two defendants because the defense was funded, at least in part, by a non-party with an interest in the patent.

Adversarial Standing

Plaintiff maintained that defense counsel violated N. J. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(f) when they represented defendants and a non-party payer. The Court held that the plaintiff, as an adversary, had standing to raise a potential conflict of interest and bring a motion to disqualify. While the Court noted that the Third Circuit had not ruled on the issue directly, “this District has held that ‘[a]dversaries, as well as former clients, may raise conflict of interest concerns.’”

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