Early last year, the In re: Incretin-Based Therapies MDL court held that the plaintiffs’ warnings claims were preempted, excluded plaintiffs’ general causation experts, and granted summary judgment to all defendants on dual preemption and causation grounds. In re: Incretin-Based Therapies Prods. Liab. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (S.D. Cal. 2021). For context, that was the second time the defendants won summary judgment; the Ninth Circuit had reversed an earlier preemption victory in an opinion that predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Albrecht. In re Incretin-Based Therapies Prods. Liab. Litig., 721 F. App’x. 580 (9th Cir. 2017). Now, however, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed summary judgment as to one defendant (Novo Nordisk A/S (“Novo”)). In re: Incretin-Based Therapies Prod. Liab. Litig., 2022 WL 898595 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2022).
Subject: Causation
Another Brick in the Wall: The District Court Finds Preemption in Fosamax Case After Remand From the Supreme Court
We have written before about the Supreme Court’s impossibility preemption decision, Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019) (Albrecht) (here, here, here, and here), highlighting some open questions and uncertainties that might come into play on remand. Albrecht held that impossibility preemption is a question of law for the court, not for the jury, “elaborated” on the “clear evidence” standard arising from Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (Wyeth), and remanded to the Third Circuit for determination of the preemption issue. That court in turn remanded to the District of New Jersey and further directed the district court “to determine the effect of the FDA’s Complete Response Letter and other communications with Merck on the issue of whether the agency actions are sufficient” to find preemption.
We predicted that the decision on remand would be “interesting” and opined that the case for preemption was “strong.” We now have that decision, In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prod. Liab. Litig., 2022 WL 855853 (D. N.J. Mar. 23, 2022) (Fosamax), and we were right on both counts.
Eastern District of Pennsylvania Issues Lone Pine Order in Zostavax MDL
Multidistrict litigation is often criticized for enabling plaintiffs to file meritless cases and then hide in large inventories, hoping to be swept up in a settlement (whether global or otherwise) before the case is meaningfully probed through discovery. Traditional tools such as plaintiff profile sheets and early screening orders represent a partial solution, as they can help identify cases with more obvious flaws such as those that are clearly time-barred or lack proof of product use. But some issues, such as critical gaps in causation, are beyond the reach of the limited case-specific discovery permitted for most cases in an MDL. Enter the Lone Pine order, a case management order by which a court requires all plaintiffs to produce evidence establishing specific elements of their claim.
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Plaintiff Shoots an Airball Against Nike in Design Defect Case
In the wake of March Madness, it is only appropriate to call attention to an opinion laced with pithy basketball puns. In Nachimovsky v. Nike, Inc. et al., 2022 WL 943421 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2022), Plaintiff injured his knee during a recreational basketball game. Blaming this injury on his new sneakers, he called foul and brought claims for negligence and products liability—specifically design defect—against Nike, which designed and manufactured the sneakers, and Shoe Fitters, which sold the sneakers.
To support his claims, Plaintiff proffered two one-page letters from a podiatrist who concluded that the sneakers were defective and a “major contributing factor” to Plaintiff’s injury. Nike (and Shoe Fitters, by incorporation) responded with a full-court press, seeking to exclude the podiatrist’s opinions under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, arguing that they were not reliable and he was not qualified to offer them.
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Snapchat’s ‘Speed Filter’: Georgia Supreme Court Revives Negligent Design Claim
On March 15, 2022, the Georgia Supreme Court revived a negligent design claim that had been brought against Snapchat, Inc. (n/k/a Snap, Inc.) involving Snap’s “Speed Filter.” As one of the few decisions across the country addressing products liability law in the context of platform “products” (more accurately categorized as services) such as Snapchat, the opinion provides a glimpse of the sort of issues that other courts may soon be required to address.
The Factual & Procedural Background:
Plaintiffs Wentworth and Karen Maynard alleged that Defendant Christal McGee was using Snapchat’s “Speed Filter” and driving over 100 miles per hour when she rear-ended them, causing severe injuries. The “Speed Filter” is a feature that allows the user to record their real-life speed on a photo or video and share it with other users. Plaintiffs sued Snap as well, alleging that Snap had negligently designed the “Speed Filter” because the filter promoted unsafe driving and encouraged dangerous behavior.
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The Rule 702 Toolbox: Cherry-Picking Is a Recipe for Exclusion
Most courts (but certainly, and unfortunately, not all of them) recognize that cherry-picking is a cardinal sin under Rule 702. Science generally requires a rigorous and conservative approach to evaluating cause-and-effect relationships. This schema inherently clashes with litigation, an arena where parties prioritize results over neutral principles of process purity.
“Cherry-picking” involves the selective consideration of facts and data to support a desired or pre-determined result, rather than the analysis of all relevant facts and data to find a scientific truth (or determine that the truth remains elusive based on the available facts and data). It evades the scrupulous adherence to principles of objectivity, rigor, and process validity that are the hallmark of the scientific method. In Daubert-speak, such a methodology does not produce “scientific knowledge.” Rather, cherry-picking represents a failure of methodology that cannot be waived off as a matter of weight rather than admissibility.
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