Preserving objections to jury instructions can be the difference between paying a significant judgment or making a plaintiff prove their case again at trial.
In October 2023, a Philadelphia jury handed down a mammoth $980 million verdict for the plaintiff in Amagasu et al. v. Mitsubishi Motors North America et al., due to an allegedly defective seat belt. The verdict included $800 million in punitive damages. Amagasu et al. v. Fred Beans Family of Dealerships, et al., No. 1594 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2025). The presiding judge increased the compensatory portion of the verdict, pushing the total award past $1 billion.
At trial, the parties vigorously disputed whether the court had to instruct the jury on the crashworthiness doctrine. Crashworthiness refers to a vehicle’s ability to reduce the probability of injury upon impact. The purpose of the crashworthiness doctrine is to maximize the safety of the occupants of a car if an accident occurs. The doctrine holds manufacturers and sellers liable when the alleged product defect does not cause the accident directly but increases the severity of injuries incurred during the accident due to the defect. Colville v. Crown Equipment Corp., 809 A.2d 916, 922 (Pa. 2002) (citing Kupetz v. Deere & Co., Inc., 644 A.2d 1213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)). In a crashworthiness case, the factfinder “must consider whether the plaintiff bore his or her burden of specifically identifying the injury that a safer alternative design would have prevented, as well as the compensable injury that was ultimately caused by the alleged design defect.”
The trial court is responsible for giving a jury charge that defines “defective condition” within the boundaries of the law. For standard strict liability claims, the plaintiff may seek instructions about either the consumer expectations test or the risk-utility assessment. Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 429 (Pa. 2014). The crashworthiness doctrine, which functions as a variation of strict liability theory, imposes more rigorous proof requirements. Under this more demanding standard, the plaintiff must prove:
- The design of the vehicle was defective and when the design was made, an alternative, safer, practicable design existed.
- The plaintiff would have suffered different injuries if the manufacturer used the alternative design.
- The plaintiff’s injuries were enhanced due to the defective design.
When a prima facie crashworthiness case has been established, the jury must be informed about the three elements of the crashworthiness doctrine. Roe v. Deere & Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1988). If the jury reaches a verdict based on instructions about strict product liability, then the omission of the crashworthiness standard is likely to prejudice the car manufacturer.
The defendant in Amagasu argued that the jury should receive instructions on the crashworthiness doctrine, given the nature of the claims and evidence. The trial judge declined, instructing the jury only on strict liability, rather than imposing the more demanding burden associated with the crashworthiness doctrine. As a result, jurors were not told to consider the different injuries the plaintiff might have sustained if the manufacturer used a safer alternative design. The defendant appealed the billion-dollar verdict.
The Superior Court vacated the verdict in December 2025. The appellate panel held that the trial court ought to have instructed the jury properly about the crashworthiness doctrine, rather than only instructing the jury on the standard strict liability doctrine. The panel reasoned that the evidence and testimony introduced by both parties at trial related to the crashworthiness doctrine. Because the elements of crashworthiness were in dispute, the jury must be instructed on the higher burden associated with crashworthiness, and instructing only on strict product liability was an abuse of discretion. Crashworthiness is not just another theory of liability that a plaintiff may choose to pursue; the doctrine is tailored to address circumstances when the product’s alleged defect “did not cause the accident but served to increase injury.”
The recent overhaul of the Amagasu verdict underscores the importance of applying heightened standards of proof, like the crashworthiness doctrine, where facts demand, and emphasizes the suit-steering role jury instructions have. Requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that the vehicle was not crashworthy poses a significant challenge when compared to typical strict liability standards. The jury ought to know the difference. Insisting on proper jury instructions and preserving objections to improper ones could be a billion-dollar decision.
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