Category: Evidence

Tort Reform is Top of Mind in 2025: Legislative Updates in Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana and Arkansas

Share

The American Tort Reform Foundation’s list of “Judicial Hellholes” often are all-too-familiar jurisdictions for product liability defendants. Some states who are home to these infamous venues, often known for producing nuclear verdicts, have recently rallied for successful tort reform. In the most recent state legislative sessions, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana and Arkansas implemented tort reform bills which may serve to neutralize the nuclear verdicts coming out of their courts.

Georgia

Following several nuclear verdicts, including a $1.7 billion verdict in Hill v. Ford Motor Co. and a $2.5 billion verdict in Brogdon v. Ford Motor Co., Georgia has recognized the impact that excessive tort costs have on Georgia’s economy and its ability to attract businesses. Georgia Governor Brian Kemp unveiled a tort reform package in early 2025 that sought to address these issues.

Continue reading “Tort Reform is Top of Mind in 2025: Legislative Updates in Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana and Arkansas”

Defective Logic: Why Recall Evidence Falls Short in Court

Share

In product liability litigation, plaintiffs often treat a product recall as though it is conclusive proof that the product is defective or that its warnings are inadequate. Some plaintiffs even cite clearly inapplicable recalls — for example, lot-specific recalls spurred by a manufacturing or labeling issue that did not impact the unit that the plaintiff received — in an effort to bolster their case before a court or in settlement discussions. Federal Rule of Evidence 407’s prohibition on the use of recall evidence to prove those points seems to do little to quell the enthusiasm. Of course, Rule 407 is grounded in part on “a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.” Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee’s note. But Rule 407 is not the only grounds on which recall evidence can (and should) be excluded.

For example, in Pecan Trust v. Nexus RVs, LLC, 2025 WL 1503940 (N.D. Ind. May 27, 2025), the plaintiffs sued the manufacturers of an RV and certain component parts alleging, among other things, that a defect in the brake pressure switch represented a fire risk. In support of that claim, they pointed solely to a safety recall for the part due to a possible fire risk and an expert witness who, based on the recall alone, concluded that the issue might pose a fire risk. The parts manufacturer moved for summary judgment, and the court granted the motion as to the breach of warranty claim after concluding that the plaintiffs had not proffered sufficient evidence of a defect. As the court noted: “That a recall has occurred may be evidence of certain things—namely as a subsequent remedial measure—but it cannot show a product defect. In reality, products subject to a recall might have a defect or might not, as a recall implements a safety campaign to ensure that none do or will manifest one.” (internal citations omitted). And, as the court noted in the specific context of the warranty claim, the fact that the plaintiffs had never presented the RV for work under the recall posed a second, equally problematic obstacle to their claim.

Continue reading “Defective Logic: Why Recall Evidence Falls Short in Court”

Fifth Circuit Clouds Threshold Dose Analysis in Ruffin v. BP

Share

Plaintiffs in toxic tort cases must prove both general and specific causation, generally through the testimony of experts. Experts must establish that a specific chemical exposure can (and did) cause the specific injury at issue. In order to make that showing, the plaintiff’s exposure must at least have exceeded the minimum harmful level of the chemical — the “threshold dose.” As the Eleventh Circuit made clear last year in its handling of In re Deepwater Horizon BELO litigation (which we discussed here), threshold dose is a concept that straddles general and specific causation. A more recent BELO case, Ruffin v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc., — F.4th —, 2025 WL 1367185 (5th Cir. May 12, 2025), shows how isolating an expert’s general causation opinion from its implications on specific causation can cloud the analysis.

In Ruffin, the plaintiff worked for five months as a clean-up worker following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. He was diagnosed with prostate cancer five years later and sued the defendant, claiming he was exposed to chemicals that caused his cancer. He described two instances of exposure: one when oil splashed onto his face while travelling by boat and another when he fell in the water. The plaintiff had a known genetic risk for prostate cancer, but his expert claimed the oil exposures were a “second and necessary hit to initiate his prostate cancer.” The defendant moved to exclude the plaintiff’s causation expert, a genetic and molecular epidemiologist, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The district court had excluded both the expert’s general and specific causation opinions as unreliable, largely for failure to specify a threshold dose, and then granted summary judgment for want of admissible expert evidence.

Continue reading “Fifth Circuit Clouds Threshold Dose Analysis in Ruffin v. BP“

Plaintiff’s Half-Baked Attempt to Prove Defect and Causation With Photographs of Moldy Bread Shows the Knead for Expert Testimony

Share

A picture may be worth a thousand words, but that doesn’t make the camera an expert witness. Product liability actions usually require expert testimony to prove defect and causation. Pictures, like other documents, can be central to an expert’s opinion on those points. But as a plaintiff in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently learned, pictures alone are insufficient. Defect and causation still require an expert’s testimony — even in cases involving products as simple as a loaf of bread.

In Kovalev v. Lidl US, LLC, 2024 WL 4642982 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2024), the plaintiff alleged that he became ill after consuming bread sold and/or baked by the defendants. He claimed to have bought eight loaves initially and experienced abdominal pain and difficulty breathing after spending two days eating the first loaf. He claimed to have thereafter discovered that the loaf was “extensively contaminated with dangerous disease-causing toxic mold.” He took pictures. Later, the plaintiff ate from a second loaf and developed nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain/cramps, general malaise, and respiratory issues “for days.” Once again, he allegedly inspected the bread after eating it and “discovered various-colored mold.” And once again, he took pictures. (As an aside, if we became ill after eating a loaf of bread and then discovered “extensive” mold on it, we would spend the foreseeable future carefully checking all our bread for mold before digging in. We might do so simply because we have read this case. But we digress.) Three months later, the plaintiff purchased four more loaves of bread from another of defendants’ stores. He claimed that while eating that bread he discovered “a large piece of black substance” inside it. Once again, he took pictures. Because he did not know what the substance was or whether he had consumed part of it, he claimed to be “severely traumatized” and afraid of developing future “cancer or damage to his organs,” “suffer[ing] a physical impact,” and losing his “enjoyment of life.”

Continue reading “Plaintiff’s Half-Baked Attempt to Prove Defect and Causation With Photographs of Moldy Bread Shows the Knead for Expert Testimony”

In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) MDL Court Rejects Plaintiffs’ Argument that Lone Pine Order is Unfair

Share

We think Lone Pine orders are pretty fair. Lone Pine orders are case management orders that require plaintiffs in multidistrict litigation (MDL) to produce specific evidence without which the plaintiffs cannot make a prima facie case. There is nothing unfair about dismissing a case that is fatally flawed for want of critical evidence that cannot be obtained. Yet Lone Pine orders rarely sit well with plaintiffs who cannot (or do not want to have to) make the showing required of them. Rather than accept their fate, these plaintiffs often attack the Lone Pine order in an effort to delay the inevitable. We discussed one such effort in the In re Zostavax MDL in 2022 and earlier this year. The In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) MDL now provides another example, not only of how plaintiffs attack Lone Pine orders but also of how courts should respond to these unmerited attacks. In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prods. Liab. Litig., 2024 WL 4362982 (E.D. La. Oct. 1, 2024).

Continue reading “In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) MDL Court Rejects Plaintiffs’ Argument that Lone Pine Order is Unfair”

Can a Treating Physician’s Medical Testimony Be “Lay Opinion”? Divided Sixth Circuit Panel Disagrees on Where to Draw the Line

Share

Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 702 govern the admissibility of lay and expert opinion testimony, respectively, in federal courts. Rule 701(c) helps paint the line between the two, providing that an opinion “based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702” cannot be admitted as a lay opinion. This requirement was added in the 2000 Amendments to Rule 701 to address what the Advisory Committee described as a risk “that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing.” Given this history, one might expect courts to err toward applying Rule 702 to any testimony that inherently draws on expertise that laypeople do not possess. But, as illustrated by the Sixth Circuit’s split decision in United States v. Betro, — F.4th —, 2024 WL 3811838 (6th Cir. 2024), some courts use a different approach.

Continue reading “Can a Treating Physician’s Medical Testimony Be “Lay Opinion”? Divided Sixth Circuit Panel Disagrees on Where to Draw the Line”