We previously blogged about a decision in the In re Deepwater Horizon BELO litigation – Ruffin v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc. – in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants in an alleged chemical exposure case based solely on exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert testimony on general causation without reaching the experts’ specific causation opinions. As it turns out, in another BELO case argued before the same panel on the same day, the panel analyzed the plaintiff’s experts’ specific causation opinions and declined to reach their general causation opinions. Williams v. BP Exploration & Production, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 1904153 (5th Cir. July 10, 2025). Notwithstanding the concerns we previously expressed about the Ruffin panel’s approach to general causation in isolation from specific causation, the Ruffin and Williams decisions provide a potent couplet illustrating that general causation and specific causation are two distinct steps in the analysis. Both must be proven in order for a plaintiff to make a prima facie case.
Subject: Causation
Tort Reform is Top of Mind in 2025: Legislative Updates in Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana and Arkansas
The American Tort Reform Foundation’s list of “Judicial Hellholes” often are all-too-familiar jurisdictions for product liability defendants. Some states who are home to these infamous venues, often known for producing nuclear verdicts, have recently rallied for successful tort reform. In the most recent state legislative sessions, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana and Arkansas implemented tort reform bills which may serve to neutralize the nuclear verdicts coming out of their courts.
Georgia
Following several nuclear verdicts, including a $1.7 billion verdict in Hill v. Ford Motor Co. and a $2.5 billion verdict in Brogdon v. Ford Motor Co., Georgia has recognized the impact that excessive tort costs have on Georgia’s economy and its ability to attract businesses. Georgia Governor Brian Kemp unveiled a tort reform package in early 2025 that sought to address these issues.
Fifth Circuit Clouds Threshold Dose Analysis in Ruffin v. BP
Plaintiffs in toxic tort cases must prove both general and specific causation, generally through the testimony of experts. Experts must establish that a specific chemical exposure can (and did) cause the specific injury at issue. In order to make that showing, the plaintiff’s exposure must at least have exceeded the minimum harmful level of the chemical — the “threshold dose.” As the Eleventh Circuit made clear last year in its handling of In re Deepwater Horizon BELO litigation (which we discussed here), threshold dose is a concept that straddles general and specific causation. A more recent BELO case, Ruffin v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc., — F.4th —, 2025 WL 1367185 (5th Cir. May 12, 2025), shows how isolating an expert’s general causation opinion from its implications on specific causation can cloud the analysis.
In Ruffin, the plaintiff worked for five months as a clean-up worker following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. He was diagnosed with prostate cancer five years later and sued the defendant, claiming he was exposed to chemicals that caused his cancer. He described two instances of exposure: one when oil splashed onto his face while travelling by boat and another when he fell in the water. The plaintiff had a known genetic risk for prostate cancer, but his expert claimed the oil exposures were a “second and necessary hit to initiate his prostate cancer.” The defendant moved to exclude the plaintiff’s causation expert, a genetic and molecular epidemiologist, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The district court had excluded both the expert’s general and specific causation opinions as unreliable, largely for failure to specify a threshold dose, and then granted summary judgment for want of admissible expert evidence.
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Ten Things to Know About the European Union’s New Product Liability Directive
After it was initially proposed more than two years ago, the European Union passed a new product liability directive (PLD) on Dec. 9, 2024, which prescribes a new legislative framework to expand and modify product liability laws created by the current PLD (originally enacted in 1985). As with other EU directives, the PLD sets legislative and policy goals that the EU’s 27 member states are obligated to implement into national law. For the PLD, they must do so within two years — by December 2026.
The new PLD was presented during the legislative phase as a modernization of pre-Internet Age laws from the 1980s. But beneath that exterior, the new PLD makes various substantive changes that are likely to increase litigation risk and costs for companies doing business in Europe. These changes will impact not only manufacturers of consumer products traditionally subject to product liability law, but also other businesses such as technology and software companies, which will be subjected to product liability law for the first time.
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Foundation, Not Façade — The Fifth Circuit Affirms the Proper Basis Requirement for Admissibility of Expert Opinions in Newsome v. International Paper Co.
In a toxic tort case, plaintiffs must establish general causation. If a substance is incapable of causing the type of injury plaintiff claims, then it certainly didn’t cause theirs. Under Texas law, toxic tort plaintiffs must prove general causation either by “direct, scientifically reliable proof,” or by “indirect” epidemiological evidence. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714-15 (Tex. 1977). In Newsome v. International Paper Company, plaintiff attempted to bypass this foundational requirement, and neither the district court, nor the Fifth Circuit was fooled. WL 5117195 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024).
In Newsome, plaintiff was a truck driver for a company that supplied International Paper with sodium hydrosulfide (NaHS). Under certain conditions, NaHS releases hydrogen sulfide (H2S), an invisible gas with a characteristic rotten-egg odor. During a delivery in January 2019, plaintiff alleged he “smelt something” then “came to” on the ground. He presented to an urgent care clinic the following day but was diagnosed with only a rash. He did not visit a doctor again for four months. Then, more than a year later, plaintiff sued International Paper claiming “a host of life-threatening injuries” related to his alleged exposure to H2S.
To Depose or Not to Depose: When Challenging Opposing Nonretained Experts Becomes Challenging
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) requires parties to disclose the opinions of experts who may present evidence at trial. If the disclosures are inadequate, Rule 37(c) requires exclusion of the opinions “unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” This almost automatic exclusionary rule can pose issues when deciding whether to depose an opposing expert. Although “Rule 26(a)(2) does not allow parties to cure deficient expert reports by supplementing them with later deposition testimony,” Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 2008), some courts nevertheless may consider an inadequate disclosure to be “harmless” once the expert’s opinions have been fully explored at deposition. On the other hand, although “[c]ourts have uniformly rejected the [idea] that the failure to depose an expert affects the right to object to the expert’s testimony,” Hinton v. Outboard Marine Corp., 828 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 (D. Me. 2011) (collecting cases), a party may need to depose an opposing expert in order to properly set up a challenge to the expert’s opinions for purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or trial if the court deems the expert’s disclosure adequate. This issue becomes particularly acute as applied to nonretained experts, who need not provide a written report under Rule 26. A recent opinion from the Northern District of Indiana aptly illustrates the quandary.
In Macchia v. Landline Trans, LLC, No. 2:21-CV-398, 2024 WL 4751091 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 12, 2024), the plaintiff alleged that he was injured in a motor vehicle accident and proffered three of his treating physicians as experts to opine on his injuries and causation. The defendants filed a three-pronged motion to exclude the experts. Notably, the defendants elected not to take the depositions of any of the three physicians. Indeed, the court’s opinion repeatedly observed how the lack of deposition testimony made it “a bit of a challenge” to summarize the background facts and adjudicate the motion.