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Fifth Circuit Clouds Threshold Dose Analysis in Ruffin v. BP

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Plaintiffs in toxic tort cases must prove both general and specific causation, generally through the testimony of experts. Experts must establish that a specific chemical exposure can (and did) cause the specific injury at issue. In order to make that showing, the plaintiff’s exposure must at least have exceeded the minimum harmful level of the chemical — the “threshold dose.” As the Eleventh Circuit made clear last year in its handling of In re Deepwater Horizon BELO litigation (which we discussed here), threshold dose is a concept that straddles general and specific causation. A more recent BELO case, Ruffin v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc., — F.4th —, 2025 WL 1367185 (5th Cir. May 12, 2025), shows how isolating an expert’s general causation opinion from its implications on specific causation can cloud the analysis.

In Ruffin, the plaintiff worked for five months as a clean-up worker following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. He was diagnosed with prostate cancer five years later and sued the defendant, claiming he was exposed to chemicals that caused his cancer. He described two instances of exposure: one when oil splashed onto his face while travelling by boat and another when he fell in the water. The plaintiff had a known genetic risk for prostate cancer, but his expert claimed the oil exposures were a “second and necessary hit to initiate his prostate cancer.” The defendant moved to exclude the plaintiff’s causation expert, a genetic and molecular epidemiologist, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The district court had excluded both the expert’s general and specific causation opinions as unreliable, largely for failure to specify a threshold dose, and then granted summary judgment for want of admissible expert evidence.

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Ten Things to Know About the European Union’s New Product Liability Directive

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After it was initially proposed more than two years ago, the European Union passed a new product liability directive (PLD) on Dec. 9, 2024, which prescribes a new legislative framework to expand and modify product liability laws created by the current PLD (originally enacted in 1985). As with other EU directives, the PLD sets legislative and policy goals that the EU’s 27 member states are obligated to implement into national law. For the PLD, they must do so within two years — by December 2026.

The new PLD was presented during the legislative phase as a modernization of pre-Internet Age laws from the 1980s. But beneath that exterior, the new PLD makes various substantive changes that are likely to increase litigation risk and costs for companies doing business in Europe. These changes will impact not only manufacturers of consumer products traditionally subject to product liability law, but also other businesses such as technology and software companies, which will be subjected to product liability law for the first time.

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You Can Buy Me Dinner, But Don’t Expect to Choose My Entrée: Motion to Disqualify for Non-Party Litigation Funding Conflicts of Interest

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You can pay for the dinner, but you cannot pick when, where or what we’re eating. At least that’s what a Magistrate Judge in the District of New Jersey decided last week in Harish v. Arbit, No. CV 21-11088-EP-AME, 2025 WL 354434 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2025), a patent dispute that resulted in the disqualification of two law firms from representing two defendants because the defense was funded, at least in part, by a non-party with an interest in the patent.

Adversarial Standing

Plaintiff maintained that defense counsel violated N. J. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(f) when they represented defendants and a non-party payer. The Court held that the plaintiff, as an adversary, had standing to raise a potential conflict of interest and bring a motion to disqualify. While the Court noted that the Third Circuit had not ruled on the issue directly, “this District has held that ‘[a]dversaries, as well as former clients, may raise conflict of interest concerns.’”

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Foundation, Not Façade — The Fifth Circuit Affirms the Proper Basis Requirement for Admissibility of Expert Opinions in Newsome v. International Paper Co.

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In a toxic tort case, plaintiffs must establish general causation. If a substance is incapable of causing the type of injury plaintiff claims, then it certainly didn’t cause theirs. Under Texas law, toxic tort plaintiffs must prove general causation either by “direct, scientifically reliable proof,” or by “indirect” epidemiological evidence. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714-15 (Tex. 1977). In Newsome v. International Paper Company, plaintiff attempted to bypass this foundational requirement, and neither the district court, nor the Fifth Circuit was fooled. WL 5117195 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024).

In Newsome, plaintiff was a truck driver for a company that supplied International Paper with sodium hydrosulfide (NaHS). Under certain conditions, NaHS releases hydrogen sulfide (H2S), an invisible gas with a characteristic rotten-egg odor. During a delivery in January 2019, plaintiff alleged he “smelt something” then “came to” on the ground. He presented to an urgent care clinic the following day but was diagnosed with only a rash. He did not visit a doctor again for four months. Then, more than a year later, plaintiff sued International Paper claiming “a host of life-threatening injuries” related to his alleged exposure to H2S.

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