Eric M. Friedman, Author at Faegre Drinker on Products

Eric M. Friedman

Eric Friedman guides clients through all stages of product liability litigation, particularly working with expert witnesses to present the science behind clients' products. By leaning on his pre-law history as a biochemist, he is able to identify key arguments for and against clients and craft winning strategies for both motion practice and trial.

View the full bio for Eric M. Friedman at the Faegre Drinker website.

Articles by Eric M. Friedman:

Causation Conundrums: Implications of Georgia Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Statute of Repose in Long-Term Product Use Cases

When does the statute of repose clock start ticking on a product liability claim involving long-term repeat use of many individually purchased units of a product? According to the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Burroughs v. Strength of Nature Global, LLC, __ S.E.2d __, 2025 WL 2918923 (Ga. Oct. 15, 2025), the short answer is that the statute of repose starts anew for each individual unit. But, as Burroughs itself illustrates, that answer creates serious problems that may require the state’s legislature to intervene.

The Burroughs plaintiff alleged she developed uterine fibroids as a result of using chemical hair relaxers manufactured by the defendants repeatedly over nearly two decades. Specifically, she claimed she began using the products in 1995 at the age of six and used them six to eight times per year through 2014 (with one brief hiatus). She developed uterine fibroids in 2018 and filed suit in 2022. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s strict liability claims on the basis that they were barred by the statute of repose. Georgia’s product liability statute of repose requires actions to be commenced within 10 years of “the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury.” OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2) (emphasis added). The trial court denied defendants’ motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding the plaintiff’s initial purchase of the first unit of the defendants’ products was a “first sale” that triggered the statute of repose and barred her filing an action more than 10 years later.

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Close, But Not Quite: Eastern District of North Carolina Excludes Experts Whose General Expertise Does Not Enable Specific Opinions Offered

Even “[a] supremely qualified expert cannot waltz into the courtroom and render opinions” unless those opinions pass muster under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 759 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999). As a recent case from the Eastern District of North Carolina illustrates, this principle is at play not only when critiquing an expert’s methodology, but also the expert’s expertise.

In Williams v. Sig Sauer, Inc., — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2643400 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 8, 2025), the plaintiff was an “enforcer” for his motorcycle club who “protect[ed]” and “monitor[ed]” the club members. He alleged that his pistol discharged and injured him while he was adjusting his position on his motorcycle. In support of his product liability claims against the manufacturer of the pistol, he proffered two expert witnesses: a gunsmith and a mechanical engineer. The defendant moved to exclude both experts and filed a motion for summary judgment.

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Nothing Shocking Here – Eleventh Circuit Affirms Defense Win in Electroconvulsive Therapy Case

When a case involves electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), one might think it originated out of the Twilight Zone. Despite the misrepresentation of such therapies in popular media, modern ECT serves as a valuable option for patients with certain severe mental health conditions who have tried other therapies without success. Although ECT is far safer today than it was when the stigma attached to it was formed, it still carries risks such as confusion, memory loss, and some physical side effects. One need not enter another dimension to envision why a plaintiff might claim damages arising from those risks. Much like Rod Serling’s anthology, the Eleventh Circuit recently closed the door on one such episode.

In Thelen v. Somatics, LLC, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 2749888 (11th Cir.), the plaintiff suffered from depression and mental health issues so severe that he attempted to take his life numerous times in numerous ways. During a two-year span, he received 95 ECT treatments to address his conditions. He was later diagnosed with a neurocognitive disorder that caused severe memory loss.

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Standing on Shaky Ground: Product Recalls Alone Do Not Constitute an Injury in Fact

Cynics have long said that no good deed goes unpunished. Such can be the case with voluntary product recalls, which often engender litigation even by plaintiffs who have suffered no real injury and merely see an opportunity for a windfall. As we recently noted, recalls do not equate with product defects. However, plaintiffs — or their attorneys — act as though purchasing a recalled product is in itself a cause of action that justifies a lawsuit. A recent opinion from the Sixth Circuit offers yet another illustration why that reasoning is unsound and highlights how defendants can attack it early in a case. Specifically, because an allegation that the product a plaintiff purchased was recalled does not raise a plausible inference of injury in fact, a plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim premised on a recall alone.

The named plaintiffs in Ward v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 24-3387, 2025 WL 2613489 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 2025), filed a putative class action in Ohio federal court alleging that they purchased peanut butter products from lots that the defendant had voluntarily recalled following a salmonella outbreak that had affected 16 people across 12 states. The plaintiffs did not, however, allege that any sampling or testing had revealed the presence of salmonella in the products they purchased. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of Article III standing, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked an injury in fact, and the district court granted the motion.

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ChatGPT As Your New Testifying Expert Under Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 707? Maybe Not.

Artificial intelligence is taking the world by storm, and the legal community is no exception. Tools that can reduce the time and cost of litigation have long been in high demand by both clients and counsel. But the tool must be fit for its purpose, and tools that generate evidence or other outputs that will be submitted to the court must pass judicial scrutiny. As video cameras became smaller and less expensive, there were fights over the admissibility of deposition videos that attorneys had recorded themselves to avoid videographer fees. Practitioners who focus on e-discovery can tell stories of hotly litigated technology-assisted review protocols. One of the newer fights concerns the admissibility of machine-generated “expert” opinions.

The U.S. Courts Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence (the “Committee”) proposes to address the issue by adding a new rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 707. The prospect of adding a new rule to regulate the admissibility of machine-generated evidence was first raised at the Committee’s November 2024 meeting. Since then, the Committee has proposed the following language for Rule 707:

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Clearing the Weeds: The Ninth Circuit Confirms that There is Not (And Never Has Been) a Presumption of Admissibility in Its Case Law Addressing Rule 702

The judge overseeing the In re Roundup Products Liability Litigation MDL once remarked that “When you [consider] Ninth Circuit law, you come away with a pretty strong feeling that the Ninth Circuit is more tolerant of shaky expert opinions than other circuits.” But that was before the 2023 amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and appellate courts around the country have gradually been addressing how the amendments impact pre-amendment case law. The Ninth Circuit recently joined the ranks in a way, affirming that same judge’s exclusion of an expert’s causation opinion while harmonizing Ninth Circuit case law with the purposes of the 2023 amendments. The opinion is Engilis v. Monsanto Company, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 2315898 (9th Cir. 2025), and the headlines may come as a surprise to some.

The case-specific underpinnings of the holding are relatively straightforward. The plaintiff alleged that he developed cancer due to exposure to a product manufactured by the defendant. His expert, however, had failed to consider the plaintiff’s obesity as a potential cause of the cancer when conducting the differential etiology that formed his specific causation opinion. He tried to get around this omission by claiming that the plaintiff was not obese, and the plaintiff argued that this was a disputed fact because his plaintiff’s fact sheet was marked “negative” for obesity. However, the expert failed to cite any medical records indicating that the plaintiff was not obese and did not engage with records that showed he was obese. Translated to Rule 702 terms, any opinion that the plaintiff was not obese was not “based on sufficient facts or data.” So, the expert argued that obesity is not a risk factor for the kind of cancer at issue and thus did not need to be considered. But his report cited no support for that proposition, which he manufactured at the hearing on the defendant’s Rule 702 motion. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that these issues rendered the expert’s specific causation opinion inadmissible.

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