The Pennsylvania Superior Court, the state’s mid-level appellate court, recently held in Kornfeind v. New Werner Holding Co., 2020 PA Super 266, that Pennsylvania’s “borrowing statute” applies only to foreign statutes of limitation and therefore does not require application of a statute of repose enacted in the state where the plaintiff used the product and was injured. But the Court also held that statutes of repose are substantive under Pennsylvania law, and therefore the statute of repose from the state of use and injury may bar the claim in a Pennsylvania court if Pennsylvania’s choice of law rules support application of that state’s law.
New Jury Selection Procedure in California: Is This the End of Peremptory Challenges? Is This the End of Batson?
Jury selection in California is undergoing significant change. In August 2020, the California legislature passed AB 3070, which was signed by Governor Gavin Newsome on September 30. Beginning in 2022, objections to peremptory challenges in criminal cases will have more teeth, including a list of presumptively invalid reasons for striking a prospective juror and a new standard of review for appellate review of a trial court’s decision. While AB 3070 does not apply officially to civil jury trials until 2026, the significant overhaul in procedure effectuated by this new law is likely to influence a court’s analysis of the civil jury selection process before that time. The new law’s aim is noble: to bring an end to discrimination in jury selection. However, critics, including many within the California judiciary, say the new procedure is “unworkable.”
California Court of Appeal Finds Amazon Is Not Shielded from Liability for Defective Product Sold Through Its Website
In a decision that may impact future e-commerce, the California Court of Appeal held in Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC that under California law, Amazon could be strictly liable for an allegedly defective battery manufactured by a third-party and sold on its website. The Court further found Amazon was not immune from liability under the Communications Decency Act. The Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Amazon.
Preemption of Structure/Function Claims
Seen frequently on grocery items, and especially on dietary supplements, structure/function claims describe the role of a nutrient or ingredient in the structure or function of the human body. Examples include “Calcium builds strong bones,” “St. John’s Wort supports mood,” and “Vitamin E supports the immune system.”
The FDA defines and regulates structure/function claims, and FDA requirements generally preempt state-law requirements that are “not identical.” 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(5). So, does compliance with FDA regulations for structure/function claims shield food and supplement manufacturers from lawsuits claiming their structure/function claims are false and misleading?
“Fruit Puree” Held a Fair Game First Ingredient in Fruit Snacks Label by California Court of Appeal
The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, recently affirmed judgment in favor of a fruit snack manufacturer who claimed “fruit” was stated to be the first ingredient on a front label but listed “fruit puree” first in the product’s ingredient list.
Plaintiff’s Fruit Snack–Based Claims
Defendants in Iglesias v. Welch Foods, Inc., et al., No. A159565, manufactured fruit snacks with a label that stated, “Fruit is our 1st Ingredient!” at the top of the front label. The snacks’ “Nutrition Fact Panel” then listed “FRUIT PUREE” as the first ingredient, followed by corn syrup.
Illinois Supreme Court Holds Employee’s Office At Home Not Sufficient to Establish Venue
The Illinois Supreme Court recently held that the presence of an employee’s home office was not sufficient to establish venue in Cook County for a negligence action arising out of a vehicle accident in Ohio. Tabirta v. Cummings, et al., 2020 IL 124798 (Ill. Oct. 22, 2020). Reversing the trial and appellate courts, the Court held that having a sole employee with a home office in Cook County did not establish an “other office” of the corporate defendant for purposes of the venue statute, 735 ILCS 5/2-101(a), and that the employee’s activities and the company’s minimal sales in Cook County did not meet the “doing business” prong of the venue statute.
The underlying negligence action arose out of a collision in Delaware County, Ohio, in which the plaintiff suffered severe injuries after his truck was hit by a tractor-trailer owned by the driver’s employer, Gilster-Mary Lee Corporation (GML). The plaintiff, who was a Cook County resident, brought suit in Cook County against GML and the other driver, who was not a resident of Cook County. GML is a Missouri corporation with a principal place of business and registered agent in Randolph County, Illinois.