Subject: Daubert

Third Circuit Confirms That Alleged Defect in “Simple” Component of More Complex System Must Be Proven by Expert Testimony When Facts Surrounding Defect Claim Are Beyond Common Knowledge

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A plaintiff who alleges that a product is defective usually has to offer expert testimony in support of that allegation.  This should come as no surprise for complex products – if it took a team of scientists and engineers to bring the product to market, then a lay jury should not be asked to evaluate an alleged defect in that product without the aid of expert testimony.  But what if a plaintiff alleges a defect in the design of a relatively simple, more familiar component of a complex product?  The Third Circuit recently addressed that question in an opinion that, although nonprecedential and in some respects peculiar to New Jersey law, illustrates how a court should approach the issue.

In Kuhar v. Petzl Co., 2022 WL 1101580 (3d Cir. Apr. 13, 2022), Plaintiff fell and injured himself while using a safety harness that he had purchased as part of a kit seven years earlier.  He alleged that the fall occurred because a bolt attached to the carabiner of the safety harness had snapped due to a design and/or “indeterminate” or manufacturing defect.  In support of his claims, Plaintiff proffered a metallurgical and materials sciences expert who identified two alleged design defects – a “sharp profile change” and “sharp threads on the bolt” – and machining grooves that the expert deemed a manufacturing defect, some combination of which he claimed had caused the accident.  But some of the expert’s defect and causation opinions were “net opinions” – New Jersey parlance for “ipse dixit” opinions – and were excluded for lack of supporting data.  Other opinions were excluded because the expert failed to define his terms or explain his reasoning.  The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that the expert’s opinions lacked both reliability and fit, and affirmed its exclusion of all of the expert’s opinions.

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Ninth Circuit Affirms Exclusion of Expert and Resulting Summary Judgment in In re: Incretin-Based Therapies MDL

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Early last year, the In re: Incretin-Based Therapies MDL court held that the plaintiffs’ warnings claims were preempted, excluded plaintiffs’ general causation experts, and granted summary judgment to all defendants on dual preemption and causation grounds. In re: Incretin-Based Therapies Prods. Liab. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (S.D. Cal. 2021). For context, that was the second time the defendants won summary judgment; the Ninth Circuit had reversed an earlier preemption victory in an opinion that predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Albrecht. In re Incretin-Based Therapies Prods. Liab. Litig., 721 F. App’x. 580 (9th Cir. 2017). Now, however, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed summary judgment as to one defendant (Novo Nordisk A/S (“Novo”)). In re: Incretin-Based Therapies Prod. Liab. Litig., 2022 WL 898595 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2022).

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Eastern District of Pennsylvania Issues Lone Pine Order in Zostavax MDL

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Multidistrict litigation is often criticized for enabling plaintiffs to file meritless cases and then hide in large inventories, hoping to be swept up in a settlement (whether global or otherwise) before the case is meaningfully probed through discovery.  Traditional tools such as plaintiff profile sheets and early screening orders represent a partial solution, as they can help identify cases with more obvious flaws such as those that are clearly time-barred or lack proof of product use.  But some issues, such as critical gaps in causation, are beyond the reach of the limited case-specific discovery permitted for most cases in an MDL.  Enter the Lone Pine order, a case management order by which a court requires all plaintiffs to produce evidence establishing specific elements of their claim.

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Eleventh Circuit Affirms Exclusion of Expert Opinion Based on Unjustified Analogy

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In the space of a single paragraph, General Electric Co. v. Joiner softened Daubert’s comment that a court’s assessment of expert opinion admissibility should focus “solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate” and gave us two of the most heavily quoted snippets in this area of law: opinions are inadmissible when supported “only by the ipse dixit of the expert,” and courts may exclude opinions for which “there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” 522 U.S. 136 (1997). Joiner’s call to assess an expert’s factual basis and reasoning was incorporated into the text of Rule 702 itself via the 2000 amendments. Regrettably though, some courts have continued to ignore gaps in an expert’s reasoning, quoting Daubert and other pre-Joiner precedent for the proposition that a court should leave disputes over such fact-based issues for a jury to decide — the very argument that Joiner rejected.

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The Rule 702 Toolbox: Proposed Amendments Seek to Reset the Application of FRE 702

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Litigators! Substantive amendments have been proposed to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The public comment period closes February 16.

Rule 702 was last amended substantively in 2000, soon after the concluding chapter in the Daubert trilogy, Kumho Tire. Those amendments were intended to reset the Rule based on the post-Daubert experience.

Lower courts had read snippets of language in Daubert through variable lenses, influenced by their level of enthusiasm or reluctance to keep flawed expert opinions from the jury. Though Daubert mandated rigorous gatekeeping, it also included Delphic comments about the “liberal thrust” of the federal rules (compared to the “rigid’ and “austere” Frye rule they replaced) and about the ability of the adversarial process to limit the impact of “shaky but admissible” evidence. Some courts misread these comments to limit the scope and depth of their gatekeeping obligation and adopted standards consistent with this vision.

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Let Me Google That for You: A Recent Central District of Illinois Opinion Highlights the Limits of Googling by Expert Witnesses Under Rule 702 and Daubert

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While we all rely on Google or other internet search engines to find and absorb information quickly these days, a recent decision in the Central District of Illinois highlights the problems for expert witnesses relying on internet research as a methodology. See Sherman v. BNSF Railway Co., Case No. 1:17-cv-01192, 2022 WL 138630 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2022). While Googling is likely a practice that many experts may engage in (though may be loathe to admit it), Google searching alone is a suspect methodology upon which to base expert opinions.

In Sherman, Plaintiff sued Defendant BNSF Railway Co. (BNSF) pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, alleging that during her employment with BNSF, she was exposed to toxic substances and carcinogens, including asbestos, that caused her to develop rectal cancer.

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