Defining the Limits of Lay Testimony in Complicated Products Cases

“So when is a question too complicated for the jury?” That is the question the Third Circuit sought to answer recently in Slatowski v. Sig Sauer, Inc., ___ F. 4th ___, 2025 WL 2178533 (3d Cir. 2025), reversing a district court’s grant of summary judgment despite affirming its exclusion of the plaintiff’s causation experts. Ironically, the Third Circuit’s analysis of when an expert opinion is required is itself so nuanced that it may require expert interpretation. Upon close inspection, the Slatowski panel’s holding is not nearly as broad as the headings might suggest.

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Message Received – Delaware Follows Federal Rule of Evidence 702

The Delaware Superior Court took the mass tort world by surprise with its May 31, 2024, refusal to exclude the plaintiffs’ experts’ causation opinions in the Zantac litigation, breaking with the federal MDL court’s prior exclusionary order and applying Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 “with a liberal thrust favoring admission.” The ruling was so unexpected that some outlets questioned whether Delaware courts would become a new preferred venue for mass tort plaintiffs. But, in a rare move, the Delaware Supreme Court granted the defendants’ request for interlocutory appeal — despite the Superior Court’s refusal to certify the order — and has now restored order, reversing the Superior Court’s decision and remanding for further proceedings. In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Litig., — A.3d —, 2025 WL 1903760 (Del. July 10, 2025).

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Double Take: Fifth Circuit’s Dual BELO Rulings Show Both General and Specific Causation Are Essential

We previously blogged about a decision in the In re Deepwater Horizon BELO litigation – Ruffin v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc. – in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants in an alleged chemical exposure case based solely on exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert testimony on general causation without reaching the experts’ specific causation opinions.   As it turns out, in another BELO case argued before the same panel on the same day, the panel analyzed the plaintiff’s experts’ specific causation opinions and declined to reach their general causation opinions. Williams v. BP Exploration & Production, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 1904153 (5th Cir. July 10, 2025). Notwithstanding the concerns we previously expressed about the Ruffin panel’s approach to general causation in isolation from specific causation, the Ruffin and Williams decisions provide a potent couplet illustrating that general causation and specific causation are two distinct steps in the analysis. Both must be proven in order for a plaintiff to make a prima facie case.

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Florida Courts of Appeal Scrutinizing Punitive Damages Claims

It is not uncommon for a product liability plaintiff to base a claim for punitive damages on little more than the same allegations that undergird a strict liability or negligence claim, while adding that the defendant knew that the product was unsafe or that the warnings were inadequate and marketed the product regardless. While that approach has worked at times in the past, recent decisions from Florida’s Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal remind us that Florida imposes a high bar on punitive damages claims. Specifically, these courts highlighted several key points related to claims of punitive damages in product liability cases: (1) Florida’s statutory requirements for punitive damages are more stringent than some other states (specifically, California) and, therefore, orders from other states awarding punitive damages are unpersuasive; (2) Florida law presumes a product is not defective if it complies with applicable government regulations; (3) the level of negligence required to plead punitive damages in Florida requires conduct equivalent to establishing criminal manslaughter; and (4) the Florida Supreme Court has all but eliminated punitive damage awards in product liability cases. These cases are discussed in further detail below.

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Tort Reform is Top of Mind in 2025: Legislative Updates in Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana and Arkansas

The American Tort Reform Foundation’s list of “Judicial Hellholes” often are all-too-familiar jurisdictions for product liability defendants. Some states who are home to these infamous venues, often known for producing nuclear verdicts, have recently rallied for successful tort reform. In the most recent state legislative sessions, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana and Arkansas implemented tort reform bills which may serve to neutralize the nuclear verdicts coming out of their courts.

Georgia

Following several nuclear verdicts, including a $1.7 billion verdict in Hill v. Ford Motor Co. and a $2.5 billion verdict in Brogdon v. Ford Motor Co., Georgia has recognized the impact that excessive tort costs have on Georgia’s economy and its ability to attract businesses. Georgia Governor Brian Kemp unveiled a tort reform package in early 2025 that sought to address these issues.

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Defective Logic: Why Recall Evidence Falls Short in Court

In product liability litigation, plaintiffs often treat a product recall as though it is conclusive proof that the product is defective or that its warnings are inadequate. Some plaintiffs even cite clearly inapplicable recalls — for example, lot-specific recalls spurred by a manufacturing or labeling issue that did not impact the unit that the plaintiff received — in an effort to bolster their case before a court or in settlement discussions. Federal Rule of Evidence 407’s prohibition on the use of recall evidence to prove those points seems to do little to quell the enthusiasm. Of course, Rule 407 is grounded in part on “a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.” Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee’s note. But Rule 407 is not the only grounds on which recall evidence can (and should) be excluded.

For example, in Pecan Trust v. Nexus RVs, LLC, 2025 WL 1503940 (N.D. Ind. May 27, 2025), the plaintiffs sued the manufacturers of an RV and certain component parts alleging, among other things, that a defect in the brake pressure switch represented a fire risk. In support of that claim, they pointed solely to a safety recall for the part due to a possible fire risk and an expert witness who, based on the recall alone, concluded that the issue might pose a fire risk. The parts manufacturer moved for summary judgment, and the court granted the motion as to the breach of warranty claim after concluding that the plaintiffs had not proffered sufficient evidence of a defect. As the court noted: “That a recall has occurred may be evidence of certain things—namely as a subsequent remedial measure—but it cannot show a product defect. In reality, products subject to a recall might have a defect or might not, as a recall implements a safety campaign to ensure that none do or will manifest one.” (internal citations omitted). And, as the court noted in the specific context of the warranty claim, the fact that the plaintiffs had never presented the RV for work under the recall posed a second, equally problematic obstacle to their claim.

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