Subject: Summary Judgement

The Culpable Co-Defendant Problem: How to Preserve Your Client’s Defenses After a Culpable Co-Defendant Files a Motion for Summary Judgment in California State Court

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Defense attorneys involved in California multi-defendant product liability lawsuits are familiar with the challenge of properly balancing the need to preserve their clients’ defenses with the strategic importance of maintaining cooperation among co-defendants.  In many cases, co-defendants’ interests are aligned, and they find the strategic benefits of cooperation outweigh any benefits of finger-pointing amongst one another.  Indeed, co-defendant infighting is risky on several fronts—it can help the plaintiffs, increase defense costs, create animosity among possible business partners, and chill future cooperation with defendants who regularly blame their co-defendants.  Inevitably, however, cases arise that involve a culpable co-defendant and a client wants to preserve its ability to attribute fault to the co-defendant at trial.  This issue becomes complex and the specific language of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(l) comes into play when the co-defendant seeks no-fault summary judgment.

Section 437c(l) operates to limit the extent to which defendants can attribute legal fault at trial to defendants who were dismissed through no-fault summary judgment.  Specifically, Section 437c(l) provides that “if a motion for summary judgment is granted on the basis that the defendant was without fault, no other defendant during trial, over plaintiff’s objection, may attempt to attribute fault to, or comment on, the absence or involvement of the defendant who was granted the motion.”  Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(l).  In other words, remaining defendants cannot assert the empty chair defense to attribute legal fault to co-defendants who obtained summary judgment.

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Treating Physician’s Informed Consent Process and Decision-Making in Device Selection Lead to Partial Summary Judgment for Device Manufacturer

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A series of recent rulings out of the Southern District of Texas in an inferior vena cava (IVC) filter case reflect how well-planned discovery can lead to a successful multipronged summary judgment motion and can effectively prune a plaintiff’s ambitious product defect claims. Conn v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-298.

In 2006, plaintiff’s physicians discovered a blood clot in his inferior vena cava. An IVC filter was inserted to prevent the blood clot from causing potentially fatal further injury. Because of plaintiff’s young age, the physician chose a removable filter. Plaintiff reported abdominal pain just four days after the IVC filter was placed. The blood clot was found to have moved and extended through and above the recently placed filter, and the physicians initiated anticoagulant therapy.

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Failure to Fully Disclose Expert Opinions Results in Summary Judgment

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) requires retained expert witnesses to provide an expert report which gives “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i).  If a party fails to disclose information required under Rule 26(a)(2), “the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).  As a plaintiff in the Western District of Washington recently learned, failure to adhere to Rule 26 can be fatal to a case.

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Second Circuit Affirms Mirena MDL Court’s “Hard Look” at Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Methodology

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On December 8, 2020, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Southern District of New York’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Bayer — and resulting closure of all cases against Bayer — in the Mirena multidistrict litigation (MDL). In re Mirena IUS Levonorgestrel-Related Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II), No. 19-2155, 2020 WL 7214264 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2020).

In the MDL, the plaintiffs alleged that the Mirena Intrauterine System had caused them to develop idiopathic intracranial hypertension (IIH). The District Court elected to focus first on whether the plaintiffs had evidence sufficient to establish general causation. The District Court held a Daubert hearing that lasted three days and featured testimony by 19 general causation witnesses — 7 for the plaintiffs and 12 for Bayer. On October 24, 2018, the District Court entered a detailed 156-page opinion granting Bayer’s Daubert motion as to all of the plaintiffs’ experts and denying as moot plaintiffs’ motion to preclude Bayer’s experts. In re Mirena IUS Levonorgestrel-Related Prods. Liab. Litig., 341 F. Supp. 3d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Bayer then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court granted for lack of general causation and dismissed all cases in the Mirena MDL.

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Pennsylvania Appellate Court Rejects Application of the Statute of Repose in Effect in the State Where an Injury Occurred Under Pennsylvania’s Borrowing Statute, But Leaves Open Possible Application Under Substantive Choice of Law Rules

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The Pennsylvania Superior Court, the state’s mid-level appellate court, recently held in Kornfeind v. New Werner Holding Co., 2020 PA Super 266, that Pennsylvania’s “borrowing statute” applies only to foreign statutes of limitation and therefore does not require application of a statute of repose enacted in the state where the plaintiff used the product and was injured. But the Court also held that statutes of repose are substantive under Pennsylvania law, and therefore the statute of repose from the state of use and injury may bar the claim in a Pennsylvania court if Pennsylvania’s choice of law rules support application of that state’s law.

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