For many litigators, sworn testimony today looks much different than it did two years ago. As the COVID-19 pandemic has required parties to limit travel and in-person proceedings, remote testimony for depositions, arbitrations and even trials has become the rule rather than the exception. With this transition, litigators have been confronted with unique circumstances and felt compelled to ask questions to confirm that the witness’s testimony is that of the witness, and only the witness. For example, is anyone else present in the room with the witness? Does the witness have any unauthorized lines of communication that could be used while the sworn testimony is proceeding? It has now become critical to ask a witness to swear under oath that there is no one else in the room with the witness and that no person is authorized to communicate with the witness during her or his testimony. Several recent decisions solidify this practice point and illustrate the consequences to litigants and lawyers when a witness surreptitiously communicates with others during the course of remote testimony.
We know the plaintiffs’ bar’s feelings about the FDA’s 510(k) clearance process. They tell the jury and the court it is antiquated. They say it does not constitute a finding of safety or efficacy. They do all they can to paint the FDA’s regulatory clearance process as meaningless and not worthy of consideration by a judge or jury. Such arguments may have some vitality in some jurisdictions. But, as we learned twice again in the last month, not in Arizona.
Back in 2012, the Arizona legislature passed a law stating that a manufacturer may not be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages if “[t]he product alleged to have caused the harm was designed, manufactured, packaged, labeled, sold or represented . . . according to the terms of an approval, conditional approval, clearance, license or similar determination of a government agency.” A.R.S. § 12-689(A)(1). The statute broadly defined “manufacturer” to include those engaged in designing, manufacturing, or formulating a product. A.R.S. § 12-689(D)(3). And it further defined “government agency” to mean any federal or Arizona agency with authority “to issue rules, regulations, orders or standards concerning the design, manufacture, packaging, labeling or advertising of a product[.]” A.R.S. § 12-689(D)(2).
The Ninth Circuit has confirmed in quadrophonic sound that plaintiffs cannot avoid preemption by relying on vague and speculative allegations to establish a parallel claim. The court affirmed the dismissal of four lawsuits by plaintiffs claiming they were injured by breast implants on the grounds that their claims are barred by the 1976 Medical Device Amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (MDA). Sewell v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, et al., no. 19-56393; Vieira v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, et al., no. 19-56394; Billetts v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, et al., no. 19-56398; Nunn v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, et al., no. 19-56391.
In each case, California plaintiffs alleged their breast implants were defective and caused them to experience fatigue, muscle pain, and migraines. The district courts dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim on grounds of preemption, and plaintiffs appealed.
Those familiar with his legend know that Hall of famer Casey Stengel managed the New York Yankees in their mid-century heyday and, for a short time at their inception, the New York Mets. But he also is remembered as one of baseball’s great characters.
One story about Stengel was told by the great broadcaster Curt Gowdy. He was having a beer with Stengel at a bar in Cleveland. Stengel received his beer and quickly downed it in one long gulp, leading Gowdy to ask why he drank it so fast. Stengel said he drank beer that way ever since “the accident.”